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A HERETICAL VIEW OF TEACHING: 
A CONTRARIAN LOOKS AT TEACHING, THE CARNEGIE 





Once again, law school pedagogy is the subject of close scru-
tiny and intense criticism.1  In 2007, two reports, the Carnegie Foun-
dation for the Advancement of Teaching Report, Educating Lawyers2 
 
*
 Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  I wish to thank my 
research assistant, Jean Delisle, for her invaluable contributions.  Thank you also to my 
colleagues who read prior drafts and made valuable suggestions. 
1 Criticism of law school pedagogy is hardly a recent phenomenon.  See, e.g., William V. 
Rowe, Legal Clinics and Better Trained Lawyers - A Necessity, 11 U. ILL. L. REV. 591 
(1917); ALFRED Z. REED, THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, 
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW (Charles Scribner‘s Sons) (1921); Oliver 
S. Rundell, Problems of the Case Method, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 699 (1926-1930); Jerome 
Frank, A Disturbing Look at the Law Schools, 2 J. Legal Educ. 189 (1949-1950); Charles A. 
Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L. J. 1402 (1965); Alan A. Stone, 
Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1971); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., A 
Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 725 (1989); Lani Guinier, et 
al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1 (1994); Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood 
Character in Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2005); Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong 
with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609 (2007); Harriet N. 
Katz, Evaluating the Skills Curriculum: Challenges and Opportunities for Law Schools, 59 
MERCER L. REV. 909 (2008).  In Vitiello‘s article, he notes that the type of criticism leveled 
at the Socratic method has changed in recent years, focusing on the premise ―that the 
Socratic method disadvantages students who have different learning styles.‖  Vitiello, supra, 
at 970. 
2 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND, & LEE S. 
SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS (2007) [hereinafter Carnegie Report].  Educating Lawyers 
is one of a series of reports issued by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching, which includes reports on education in the professions of engineering, the clergy, 
nursing, and medicine as well as its report on education in the law.  Id. at 3. 
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and Best Practices For Legal Education3 were published.  Both of 
these publications have triggered extensive re-evaluation of the peda-
gogy in law schools.4  As Robert MacCrate5 states in the Foreword to 
Best Practices, the Carnegie Report and Best Practices share a cen-
tral message.6  That message has three components.  Law schools 
 
3 ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007) [hereinafter Best 
Practices].  Best Practices is the report of the Best Practices Project of the Clinical Legal 
Education Association. 
4 See Best Practices for Legal Education, BESTPRACTICESLEGALED, 
http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/ (last visited July 17, 2001).  This blog site 
offers downloadable presentation materials and a listing of seminars on implementing the 
recommendations in the Carnegie Report and Best Practices.  Programs included: 
Mar. 2010 – University of Miami School of Law, ―Externships 5: Ex-
ternships in Changing Times‖ 
Mar. 2009 – Maryland University School of Law, ―Best Practices in 
Clinical Legal Education‖ 
Sept. 2008 – University of Washington School of Law, ―Legal Education 
at the Crossroads: Ideas to Implementation‖ 
July 2008 – Michigan State University College of Law, ―Great Lakes 
Symposium of Legal Scholarship & Best Practices‖ 
Mar. 2008 – Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 
―Rethinking Legal Education‖ 
Mar. 2008 – American University Washington College of Law, ―Innova-
tions in First Year Curriculum‖ 
Feb. 2008 – Georgia State Law School, ―International Conference on the 
Future of Legal Education‖ 
Dec. 2007 – Syracuse University College of Law, First Annual Ups-
tate/Western New York and Beyond Regional Clinical Conference 
―Forming a Regional Community to Share and Define Best Practices‖ 
Nov. 2007 – University of South Carolina School of Law, ―Legal Educa-
tion at the Crossroads: Ideas to Action, Part I‖ 
Nov. 2007 – Mercer Law School, ―The Opportunity for Legal 
Education‖. 
5 Robert MacCrate is senior counsel at the New York firm Sullivan & Cromwell LLP.  He 
received his undergraduate degree from Havorford College, two doctor of law degrees from 
Havorford College and Union College, and his Juris Doctorate from Harvard Law School.  
Dr. MacCrate authored a July 1992 report to the American Bar Association (hereinafter 
MacCrate Report) which contained specific recommendations for changes to law school 
curriculums.  However, though highly respected in the field of legal education, the 
recommendations in his report have not been widely adopted.  See John O. Sonsteng, et al., 
A Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the Twenty-First Century, 34 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303, 332 (2007) (stating that although the report stirred discussions 
on implementation of change, ―in the following years, schools reverted to the status quo with 
very little movement toward reform‖); see also Russell G. Pearce, MacCrate’s Missed 
Opportunity: The MacCrate Report’s Failure to Advance Professional Values, 23 PACE L. 
REV. 575, 585 (2003) (stating that ―[m]ajor flaws in the MacCrate Report's treatment of 
[professional] values led to the Report's minimal impact in that area‖). 
6 Robert MacCrate, Foreword to STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at viii. 
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should: 
1. ―broaden the range of lessons they teach, reducing 
doctrinal instruction that uses the Socratic dialogue 
and the case method;‖7 
2. ―integrate the teaching of knowledge, skills and 
values, and not treat them as separate subjects ad-
dressed in separate courses;‖8 and 
3. ―give much greater attention to instruction in pro-
fessionalism.‖9 
Both reports recommend that these changes be implemented 
throughout the entire curriculum, with the result that if their recom-
mendations were followed substantial changes in the first year curri-
culum would occur.  Indeed, the Carnegie Report states that 
―[a]lthough our discussion ranges considerably beyond the first-year 
experience, because that experience is so significant in shaping the 
whole of legal education, it is our emphasis.‖10  Best Practices con-
cludes that in the first year, ―[t]he Socratic dialogue and casebook 
method should be used sparingly.  Context-based instruction, espe-
cially discussion of problems should be the prevalent method of in-
struction.‖11 
The two reports differ to some extent in the deficiencies they 
find in the Socratic dialogue and their emphases on these deficien-
cies.  The Carnegie Report states that the pedagogy absent in Socratic 





10 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.  Interestingly however, in subsequent conferences 
Professor Wegner has focused her remarks more on the curricular changes beyond the first 
year, rather than in the first year.  See Symposium, The Opportunity for Legal Education (pt. 
1), 59 MERCER L. REV. 821, 836 (2008).  For example, at a symposium held at Mercer 
University, Walter F. George School of Law, Professor Wegner discusses the use of Socratic 
dialogue (she refers to it as the ―case-dialogue‖ method) in the first year and relates her 
observations.  Id. at 830-36.  She then goes on to state that law schools should think about 
other approaches to use after the first year that might free up resources.  Id. at 836.  She goes 
on to say that there is an opportunity to build more progression away from the case-dialogue 
method in the upper level curriculum.  Id. at 838.  On the contrary, Professor Stuckey, lead 
author of Best Practices, does concentrate on the topic of the need for reform in the first 
year.  See Symposium, The Opportunity for Legal Education (pt. 2), 59 MERCER L. REV. 
859, 861 (2008). 
11 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 276. 
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nents: experience with clients and concern that the legal profession 
lacks ethical substance.12  The Report also argues that law schools‘ 
overemphasis on legal analysis can color or even undermine their at-
tempt to teach professionalism and ethics to such an extent that later 
attempts by law schools to inculcate these perspectives and skills may 
inevitably fail.13 
Best Practices, on the other hand, not only shares the con-
cerns of the Carnegie Report that Socratic dialogue has ―significant 
defects as an instructional tool‖ and that it teaches ―only a small part 
of the skills and knowledge needed to practice law effectively and 
responsibly,‖ but goes on to state that the ―most important reason‖ to 
limit the use of Socratic dialogue is because too many law school 
professors abuse the method with the result that students‘ sense of 
―self-worth, security, authenticity, and competence‖ are unnecessari-
ly undermined.14 
Although the reports have much to recommend them, I be-
lieve that their position with respect to the first year curriculum is in 
error, and perhaps into part of the second year as well.15  In essence, 
their argument is two-fold.  First, that Socratic dialogue intrinsically 
results in the problems mentioned and second, that experiential learn-
ing will teach analytical and synthesis skills, as well as fostering pro-
fessionalism, better than Socratic dialogue.  This article will address 
both these points.  First, I argue that Socratic dialogue does not in-
trinsically cause the harms claimed above.  This argument has two 
components.  First, much of the harm attributed to Socratic dialogue 
is misguided and is in fact a critique of bad teaching technique rather 
than any flaw intrinsic in Socratic dialogue.  Second, to the extent 
that some of the observations regarding the nature of Socratic dialo-
gue are accurate, they should not be considered as flaws but rather as 
strengths with respect to the pedagogy that Socratic dialogue fosters. 
My second point, that in the first year, experiential learning 
 
12 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 56-57. 
13 Id. at 141-42.  The Report does make passing reference to language from Best Practices 
stating that the Socratic dialogue is used as a means of humiliating or embarrassing students, 
but that aspect of the Socratic dialogue is not the Report‘s main emphasis.  Id. at 57. 
14 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 134, 138-39.  While the Carnegie Report is well-
balanced in dealing with the pros and cons of the Socratic dialogue, virtually the entire tenor 
of Best Practices seems to be marked by a substantial antipathy towards the Socratic 
dialogue. 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 129-30. 
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does not teach analytical and synthesis skills better than Socratic di-
alogue, nor does it do a better job of fostering professionalism, also 
has two components.  First, analysis and synthesis are foundational 
skills that are more effectively taught by focusing primarily on these 
skills by use of Socratic dialogue.  Second, I argue that the inculca-
tion of professionalism is not a function of method of instruction but 
rather a function of the entire culture created by the law school envi-
ronment rather than the specific curriculum.  Thus, within the first 
year curriculum, experiential learning is not intrinsically superior to 
Socratic dialogue for the purpose of inculcating professionalism.  Ra-
ther, again, problems with respect to inculcating professionalism are 
a function of the quality of teaching rather than the curriculum. 
Finally, I argue that the failure of the Carnegie Report and 
Best Practices to recognize that many of the problems they are trying 
to address are due to poor teaching rather than the Socratic dialogue 
means those reports‘ recommendations cannot achieve the results 
hoped for.  Current law school hiring practices do not select for good 
teachers.  Instead, they select for qualities that are not predictive of 
quality teaching.  Until law schools start selecting for teaching skills, 
the quality of law school faculty teaching is not likely to improve.  
And if the true problem is the ability of law school faculty to teach, 
then changing the curriculum without improving the quality of the 
teachers is unlikely to improve the law school educational expe-
rience. 
II. THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AND ITS CRITICS 
At the heart of the curriculum for the first year to year and a 
half in most law schools is the Socratic dialogue.  This is also called 
the case method or case-dialogue method.  For purposes of simplici-
ty, I will use the term Socratic dialogue to refer to this method.  Al-
though the use of the Socratic dialogue varies substantially from pro-
fessor to professor, there are certain characteristics that are constant.16  
Best Practices describes the Socratic dialogue as having four compo-
 
16 See Vitello, supra note 1, at 965.  Professor Vitiello states that it is difficult to find a 
standard definition of the Socratic method.  Id. at 961.  He suggests that one of the reasons 
there are so many different criticisms of the method is that there are so many variations of it 
and thus critics vary in what is objectionable.  Id. at 962. 
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nents.17  First, the professor selects a student and asks the student to 
state the case.18  This consists of asking the student to cull from the 
opinion the facts of the case and the rule of law the court has applied.  
The student is required to analyze the components of the rule of law, 
apply it to the facts, and then explain why the application of the rule 
to the facts results in the outcome.19  The professor then uses closed 
hypothetical questions20 that compare the instant case to the facts and 
rules of prior cases studied.21  The professor then uses open hypothet-
ical questions to demonstrate how the relatively simple determination 
of facts and the applicable rule conceal complexity and indetermin-
ance.22  This requires the student to engage in interpreting what he or 
she has read, rather than merely to recite it.23  Finally, the professor 
draws lessons from the discussion about the processes involved in be-
ing a lawyer and the function of a judge.24  This description is very 
similar to descriptions set forth by other scholars25 and for purposes 
of this paper, I will use the description from Best Practices as the 
template from which I will work.26 
Initially—perhaps even paradoxically given their criticism of 
Socratic dialogue—even the Carnegie Report and Best Practices rec-
 
17 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 213-16.  Best Practices takes this description almost 
verbatim from Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue About 
Socratic Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249, 265-70 (1997). 
18 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 213. 
19 Id. at 213-214. 
20 Closed hypothetical questions are those to which the professor knows the answer. 
21 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 214. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 214-15. 
24 Id. at 216. 
25 See, e.g., Vitello, supra note 1, at 961-65; Edwin W. Patterson, The Case Method in 
American Legal Education: Its Origins and Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 17 (1951); Orin 
S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113, 114 n.3 
(1999).  Elizabeth Mertz would add to this description that often the professor will 
accomplish these tasks through extended questioning of a single student, frequently 
interrupting the student, providing few answers, and insisting that the student pay close 
attention to the text of the case, as well as a ―challenging, if not hostile tone.‖  ELIZABETH 
MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL 44 (2007). 
26 This definition actually conflates two components.  The first is the use of a Socratic 
teaching technique, which can be applied to other teaching methods besides using cases.  
Second is the use of case law to teach the curriculum.  Case law can be taught by means 
other than a Socratic method.  However, the predominant method of teaching in law schools 
is the application of Socratic technique to the teaching of case law in the method described 
above.  Criticism of the Socratic dialogue deals with both aspects, and I will address each of 
these criticisms where appropriate. 
6
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ognize that, used correctly, Socratic dialogue has great merit.  The 
Carnegie Report states that: 
        The case-dialogue method is a potent form of 
learning-by-doing. . . . It encourages, at least for skill-
ful teachers, the use of all the basic features of cogni-
tive apprenticeship.  It seems well suited to train stu-
dents in the analytical thinking required for success in 
law school and legal practice.  In legal education, 
analysis is often closely integrated with application to 
cases.  The derivation of legal principles . . . generally 
occurs through a process of continuously testing, using 
hypothetical fact patterns or contrasting examples to 
clarify the scope of rules and reasoning being distilled.  
This central role of analysis and application, then is 
well served by the method.27 
The Carnegie Report goes on to say that the Socratic dialogue is a 
powerful motivator and that the motivation does not come solely 
from the fear of being called on in class.  Rather, the Carnegie Report 
states that, at least in the best taught classes the authors observed, 
[I]t was the narrative nature of legal argument itself, 
especially its dramatic character, that motivated stu-
dents. . . . [L]egal proceedings, especially litigation . . . 
have an inescapable narrative dimension, with story 
and counter-story being constructed by the contending 
parties to the dispute. . . . As we saw, when performed 
in back-and-forth argument by a professor and an ad-
vanced student, the fine points of legal arguments, es-
pecially when they serve as the turning points of these 
abstract dramas, can rivet students‘ attention.  At such 
moments they generate the sort of collective efferves-
cence that burns particular classroom events into the 
memory, gradually reshaping students into profession-
als.28 
Best Practices also recognizes the strength of the Socratic dialogue, 
 
27 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 74-75. 
28 Id. at 75. 
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although its recognition of the Socratic dialogue‘s merits is much 
more muted.29  Best Practices admits that the Socratic dialogue can 
be effective when used appropriately.  It quotes Mark Aronson, who 
described some of the competencies the Socratic dialogue develops: 
[T]he case method provides students with simulated 
practice in how appellate courts formally reason, and 
predicting what courts will do is a core skill central to 
a lawyer‘s claim to professional expertise. . . . 
[F]eatures of the case method are also applicable when 
confronting problems in other contexts.  These fea-
tures include the grounding of analysis in facts, the 
comprehensive spotting of relevant issues and con-
cerns, the search for governing rules, principles or 
standards by which to make decisions, the weighing of 
competing policy considerations in light of their con-
sequences, the value placed on consistency and defe-
rence to past decisions, the utility of reasoning by 
analogy, the importance of reasoned justification, and 
the need to reach a conclusion and make a decision 
even if not perfect.  Tailored and applied flexibly, the 
case method as a method of deliberation can provide a 
logical, overall methodology for approaching and 
thinking about all sorts of situations.30 
Of course, recognition of the strengths of the Socratic dialo-
gue is not limited to the Carnegie Report and Best Practices.  Other 
scholars have recognized the value of the Socratic dialogue.31  Given 
the recognition of the efficacy of Socratic dialogue the question must 
 
29 The entire tenor of Best Practices is marked by what seems to be a substantial antipathy 
towards the Socratic dialogue.  This antipathy is ill-founded and leads to inapt conclusions 
about the role of Socratic dialogue in the curriculum. 
30 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 212 (alteration in original) (quoting Mark Neal 
Aaronson, Thinking Like a Fox: Four Overlapping Domains of Good Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 1, 6 (2002)).  Even this citation is evidence of the report‘s antipathy towards Socratic 
dialogue.  The quote is taken from an article that is critical of over-reliance on the case 
method. 
31 See Vitiello, supra note 1; see also Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method and 
Women Law Students: Humanize, Don’t Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S STUD. 37 
(1997); see also James R. Beattie, Jr., Socratic Ignorance: Once More into the Cave, 105 W. 
VA. L. REV. 471 (2003); see also David D. Garner, Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the 
Case Method in the Twenty-First Century, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307 (2000). 
8
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arise, why is there such dissatisfaction with the Socratic dialogue that 
the Carnegie Report and Best Practices recommend radical changes 
to the curriculum involving substantial de-emphasis of the Socratic 
dialogue?32 
Certainly, to the extent that the two reports are concerned 
about the overemphasis of the Socratic dialogue throughout the entire 
law school curriculum, such criticism may well be justified.  There is 
much more to being an effective lawyer than the ability to analyze 
and synthesize the holdings in cases.  Lawyers must be problem solv-
ers.  This means that, among other things, they must be able to listen 
effectively to clients, be able to diagnose and analyze issues, nego-
tiate, perhaps mediate, and, perhaps most important, devise the best 
solution for their clients, taking into account the economic and emo-
tional effects the legal problem being dealt with may have on the 
client.33  In addition, potential lawyers need the opportunity to obtain 
research, drafting, litigating, negotiating, writing and trial skills.  
There are better alternatives to Socratic dialogue for teaching many 
of these skills, and any law school that focused solely on Socratic di-
alogue would ill prepare its students.  However, this is a comparative-
ly unwarranted concern.  Schools are well aware of the need for di-
versity in their curricula so as to provide students with training in 
areas other than Socratic dialogue. 
The American Bar Association Standards for Approval of 
Law Schools require that students must receive ―substantial instruc-
tion‖ in ―writing in a legal context, including at least one rigorous 
writing experience in the first year and at least one additional rigor-
 
32 Although I intend this as a rhetorical question, Professor Amy Mashburn speculates that 
several changes in law schools, starting in the 1970s, most especially changes in law 
professors, have resulted in continuing, increasingly intense criticism of Socratic dialogue.  
Amy R. Mashburn, Can Xenophon Save the Socratic Method?, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 597, 
624-32 (2008).  Mashburn argues that, among other factors, law professors tenured in the 
1980s and more recently have an ―anti-authoritarian attitude that equates rules and 
institutional restraints with conservatism, totalitarianism, and formalism.  Such a mind-set 
bridles at enforcing imposed structures, restrictions, and rules because it sees them as 
dictatorial and unnecessariy rigid.  To the intellectually free-spirited, treating students like 
adults means not imposing constraints on them or requiring teachers to be enforcers.‖  Id. at 
624. 
33 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 21 (quoting Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-
Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14, 14 
(1999)). 
9
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ous writing experience after the first year,‖34 ―other professional 
skills generally regarded as necessary for effective and responsible 
participation in the legal profession,‖35 and ―the history, goals, struc-
ture, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal profession and its 
members.‖36 
However, the gist of the Carnegie Report and Best Practices 
is not that there is overemphasis on the Socratic dialogue throughout 
the entire curriculum (although, to be sure, both reports do address 
that concern in some detail).  Rather, both reports state that they rec-
ommend substantial reform of the first year curriculum, with de-
emphasis on Socratic dialogue.37  So the question must be, why do 
they recommend this?  The answer in both reports is two-fold.  First, 
Socratic dialogue has many harmful effects on students.38  Second, it 
fails to achieve the pedagogical objectives of the reports.39 
These are two different, serious criticisms that any advocate 
of Socratic dialogue must address.  However, the question arises as to 
whether these reputed shortcomings of Socratic dialogue are intrinsic 
in the method itself or whether there is some other reason why So-
cratic dialogue falls short.  Legal scholarship is rife with articles criti-
cal of Socratic dialogue suggesting that these shortcomings are intrin-
 
34 Standard 302 (a)(3), 2007-2008 Standards for Approval of Law Schools, ABA SEC. OF 
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR (2007-2008). 
35 Id. at (a)(4). 
36 Id. at (a)(5). 
37 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (―Although our discussion ranges considerably 
beyond the first-year experience, because that experience is so significant in shaping the 
whole of legal education, it is our emphasis.‖); STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 22 (―The 
first year curriculum gives students a skewed and inaccurate vision of the legal profession 
and their roles in it.‖). 
38 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 73 (―[Socratic dialogue and the case method] and 
beliefs that underlie them undermine ‗the sense of self-worth, security, authenticity, and 
competence among students.‘ ‖ (quoting Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the 
Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the 
Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 125 (2002))); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 57-
58 (citing criticisms of Socratic Dialogue mentioned in Best Practices and saying that if 
these criticisms are correct, then other means of teaching besides Socratic dialogue are 
needed). 
39 See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 138 (―The skills and knowledge that can be 
acquired through the Socratic dialogue and case method are only a small part of the skills 
and knowledge needed to practice law effectively and responsibly.‖); see also SULLIVAN ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 57 (suggesting that the Socratic dialogue fails to teach students the 
―significance—and . . . the techniques—of interpretative, interactive, narrative, and problem-
solving work‖). 
10
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sic in the method itself.  However, I believe such criticisms are mis-
guided.  I suggest that the criticisms and recommendations of the 
Carnegie Report and Best Practices are systemic responses to indi-
vidual problems of poor teaching.  As such, they are likely to be inef-
ficient at improving pedagogy at best and ineffective at worst. 
III. THE CRITIQUE OF THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS BAD 
PEDAGOGY IS ERRONEOUS 
There is a substantial body of work arguing that the Socratic 
dialogue is intrinsically flawed.40  The criticisms of the Socratic di-
 
40 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Socrates and Langdell in Legal Writing: Is the Socratic 
Method a Proper Tool for Legal Writing Courses?, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 284 (2007) 
(―The main charge that has been leveled against the Socratic method‘s use is that the method 
humiliates and terrorizes students.‖); Beattie, supra note 31, at 472 (―Most critics of Socratic 
teaching [assert] that the method, as currently practiced, inevitably humiliates, intimidates, 
and silences students.‖); David D. Garner, Comment, Socratic Misogyny? – Analyzing Fe-
minist Criticisms of Socratic Teaching in Legal Education, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1597, 1601 
(2000). 
[T]he Socratic method has often been described in terms of ―Socratic 
kung fu.‖  Advocates of the method (yes, these are the advocates!) tout 
the Socratic method as a form of ―ritualized combat,‖ a ―civilized       
battle,‖ a ―boot camp‖ of sorts, in which professors utterly ―destroy‖      
students by making ―friendly assaults‖ on their answers.  Such advocates 
imbue the Socratic method with an uncanny sado-masochistic            
quality . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted); Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 
NEB. L. REV. 113, 119-20 (1999). 
        The most common complaint against the Socratic method is that it 
is cruel and psychologically abusive.  Socratic professors are quick to 
criticize imperfect student answers, subjecting students to public degra-
dation, humiliation, ridicule, and dehumanization.  This torture often 
scars students for life.  Even among students who do not speak in class, 
the possibility that they will be called on can be incapacitating.  Non-
traditional students such as women and minorities are particularly vul-
nerable, both because they are likely to be used as ‗spokespersons‘ for 
their race or gender, and because many have already internalized stereo-
types of inadequacy in the combative and mostly white and male atmos-
phere of traditional law schools. 
Id. (citations omitted); Tanisha Makeba Bailey, The Master’s Tools: Deconstructing the So-
cratic Method and Its Disparate Impact on Women Through the Prism of the Equal Protec-
tion Doctrine, 3 Margins: MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 125, 127 (2003). 
While its promoters contend the [Socratic] Method is intended to em-
power all law students with the knowledge of the law, I argue that this 
teaching strategy is built upon fear, humiliation, and intimidation.  It 
hinders the academic development of women by maintaining a denigrat-
11
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alogue in the literature claiming it is harmful to students fall into two 
categories.  In the first category, I contend that the criticisms are not 
really attributable to the Socratic dialogue but to ineffective use of 
the Socratic dialogue.  In other words, the true problem is bad teach-
ing or some other problem endemic to the system of legal teaching.  
The most prevalent criticism in this category is the claim that Socrat-
ic dialogue is humiliating or degrading.  This criticism focuses pri-
marily on the use of Socratic dialogue rather than on the use of cases 
as primary teaching material.  However, there is also criticism of the 
use of cases as the primary teaching method.  This criticism is equal-
ly misguided; looked at carefully, one sees that it is also actually crit-
icism of how professors teach, in this instance how they utilize the 
cases. 
In the second category are observations of characteristics re-
garding Socratic dialogue that are accurate, but about which there is 
disagreement as to whether or not those characteristics are desira-
ble.41  The most common of these is that it forces students to divorce 
themselves from their feelings, which can be characterized as deper-
sonalization by critics or as a skill necessary to the effective practice 
of law by advocates. 
A. Many Criticisms of the Socratic Dialogue Are 
Really Criticisms of the Professors Who Teach by 
This Method 
1. Attribution of Humiliation as Intrinsic to the 
Socratic Dialogue Is Erroneous 
Perhaps the best place to start an analysis of which alleged 
 
ing psychological atmosphere of silence, and adversarial competition. 
Id.; Jeremy M. Miller, Legal Ethics and Classroom Teaching: The Apology, 14 WIDENER 
L.J. 365, 428 (2005) (concluding that ―although Socratic/Case Method dialogue is intellec-
tually stimulating, it is often intimidating to many students (to the point of felt humiliation) 
and confusing to most students—since conclusions are typically not furnished by the profes-
sor‖). 
41 There is some overlap between these first two categories.  For example, teaching 
students about the need to dissociate themselves from their feelings for the purposes of 
analyzing a client‘s case may very well be depersonalizing if it is done badly.  But it need 
not inevitably have that effect. 
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flaws in the Socratic dialogue are really attributable to bad teaching is 
the frequent allegation that the Socratic dialogue exposes the student 
to humiliation and embarrassment.  I suspect almost everyone can 
agree that a professor who uses the Socratic dialogue for the specific 
purpose of humiliating and embarrassing students is abusing the 
teaching method.  The more difficult issue is the essential claim that 
use of the Socratic dialogue undermines students‘ sense of self-worth, 
security, authenticity, and competence; in other words, that it intrinsi-
cally humiliates and embarrasses students.42 
Best Practices states that misuse or abuse of the Socratic di-
alogue is what creates the problem of humiliation,43 stating what it 
says is the ―most important‖ reason that law schools should rethink 
their use of the Socratic dialogue: 
        The main reason is that too many law school 
teachers abuse [the Socratic dialogue] and contribute 
to the damage that the law school experience unneces-
sarily inflicts on many students.  Traditional teaching 
methods and beliefs that underlie them undermine the 
sense of self-worth, security, authenticity, and compe-
tence among students.44 
Initially, it is important to recognize that humiliation is not the 
same as discomfort or embarrassment.  Proper use of the Socratic di-
alogue may well cause discomfort or even embarrassment in some 
students.  However, that is a far cry from humiliation.  While stu-
dents‘ discomfort and embarrassment should be mitigated to the ex-
tent possible, these emotions will be an inevitable byproduct of the 
students‘ being challenged in the classroom in a new discipline. 
While there are numerous aspects that go into good teach-
 
42 Beattie, supra note 31, at 472 (―Most critics of Socratic teaching answer that the 
method, as currently practiced, inevitably humiliates, intimidates, and silences students.‖); 
Andrew S. Watson, Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal 
Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 109 (1968); Lisa G. Lerman, First Do No Harm: Law 
Professor Misconduct Toward Law Students, 56 J. LEGAL ED. 86, 91(2006); THOMAS L. 
SHAFFER & ROBERT SAMUEL REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE 158 
(1977). 
43 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 139. 
44 Id. 
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ing,45 one aspect that virtually everyone, both critics of and adherents 
to the Socratic dialogue, agrees on is that professors must have high 
expectations of their students.46  But it is not enough to simply have 
high expectations of students.  It is more important to make high de-
mands of students. 
This is especially true in a law school classroom, where there 
are limited opportunities for direct feedback and assessment.  While 
you can tell students that you have high expectations for them and 
even take actions that demonstrate your high expectations, the reality 
is that it will not impact them unless they are required to live up to 
those high expectations.  As Ken Bain points out, this does not mean 
assigning excessive amounts of work.47  Rather, it means assigning 
material that gives students an opportunity to perform at a high intel-
lectual level and then requiring them to perform at that high level 
both in class and out of class. 
However, simply telling the students this is required is not 
sufficient.  When they are called on to recite, their answers must be 
relentlessly dissected to explore the students‘ analyses.  Absent that 
in-class experience, many students will not do the work necessary to 
master the material.  If they believe that they can slide through the 
course without being held to high standards, many students will try to 
do as little as necessary to slide by.  Thus, each student must know 
that he or she will be held to high standards in class. 
Such a demand for excellence will undoubtedly make a sig-
nificant number of students, if not all, uncomfortable.  This is be-
cause they are novices to the discourse.  Ann Iijima describes this 
feeling as ―being embarrassed for not being good at a new area of 
study.  It happens when people are really competent in their previous 
dealings and then face something new and confusing.‖48 
As Anthony D‘Amato points out, ―Teaching is an attempt to 
 
45 While it is probably impossible to make a comprehensive list of such aspects, most 
faculty would agree that the following aspects are important to effective teaching: 1. high 
expectations; 2. making students understand that learning for its own reward (as opposed to 
good grades) is crucial to the best learning; 3. gearing learning towards metacognition and 
making students think for themselves; 4. providing assessment as frequently as is 
practicable; 5. good relations with students. 
46 Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law 
School, 52 J. LEGAL ED. 75, 85 (2002). 
47 KEN BAIN, WHAT THE BEST COLLEGE TEACHERS DO 71 (2004). 
48 ANN L. IIJIMA, THE LAW STUDENT‘S POCKET MENTOR 85 (2007). 
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change the student‘s mind‖ physically, not just metaphorically.49  
When learning takes place, new neural pathways are formed.  This is 
accomplished only by getting past the mind‘s ―censors,‖ which 
people use as shortcuts to dealing with and analyzing every day sce-
narios and questions faced.  While these censors are useful for deal-
ing with every day scenarios—such as recognizing situations and in-
stinctively dealing with them, rather than having to reason out a 
proper response from scratch—they inhibit the kind of learning that 
needs to take place in mastering a new skill, such as learning how to 
learn the law.  Getting past these censors and creating new neural 
pathways, causing learning to take place, ―requires sharp challenges 
to the conclusions that existing pathways compel.‖50  This requires 
mental struggle, something that students not used to this kind of 
learning,51 will find uncomfortable.  Indeed, D‘Amato, recalling his 
law school experience, describes it as ―alienating and refreshing, fru-
strating and challenging, upsetting and liberating.‖52 
In other words, feeling embarrassed is not a function of the 
professor intending to make the student feel that way; it is the normal 
course of events for students to feel uncomfortable, even embar-
rassed, in their performance at first.  Nor is there anything wrong 
with their being stressed. 
As Barbara Glesner Fines, a critic of Socratic dialogue, points 
out, stress, so long as it is not excessive, can be useful.  As she states, 
A certain amount of tension and anxiety can be useful 
in motivating students to do their best.  The stress of 
law school can lead students to forge strong alliances 
among their colleagues.  The tension of a well-
directed Socratic dialogue can motivate students to 
learn subject matter and develop independent learning 
skills.  Successfully meeting and overcoming a frigh-
tening challenge makes courage easier the next time 
 
49 Anthony D‘Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student 
Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 462 (1987). 
50 Id. at 466. 
51 See infra text accompanying footnotes 88-90. 
52 D‘Amato, supra note 49, at 465. 
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around.53 
It is crucial to recognize that students experience being novic-
es to the discourse.  For if this is true, then the students‘ intimidation 
and discomfort is not a function of the Socratic dialogue.  Further, not 
only is it not something to avoid, it is a signal that the students are 
making an effort to stretch and learn new knowledge and skills. 
This does not mean that the professor should not be sensitive 
to students‘ stress.  To keep the stress from being excessive and 
therefore counterproductive, it is well worthwhile to attempt to miti-
gate it to the extent possible.  However, some degree of discomfort 
should be inevitable, and it must be recognized that this discomfort 
can be productive, not counterproductive. 
While part of the discomfort that students feel is the result of 
the fact that they are learning a new skill that they are not very good 
at initially, consider also that proper preparation for the Socratic di-
alogue requires substantial preparatory work before the classroom 
discussion starts and that the result of the Socratic dialogue is often a 
non-definitive resolution, while many students crave definitive res-
ponses.54  When these two characteristics are combined, it is not a 
surprise that students will feel uncomfortable.  However, neither the 
need for extensive preparation pre-class nor a lack of definitive reso-
lution is unique to the Socratic dialogue.  It is possible for both of 
these characteristics to exist in other methods of teaching.  In fact, I 
will suggest that regardless of the method of teaching, if the professor 
is intent on pushing students to do their best work
 
then both these 
characteristics will exist.  Regardless of whether the professor is us-
ing the Socratic dialogue or a version of the problem method or the 
student is participating in a clinic, substantial preparatory work is ne-
cessary to be able to answer the professor‘s questions, and it is quite 
 
53 B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 CONN. L. REV. 627, 644-45 
(1991).  Glesner then states, accurately, that although stress can be productive to a student‘s 
learning, too much stress can be counterproductive.  Id. at 645.  She then goes on to criticize 
the Socratic dialogue as being a cause of undue stress.  Id. at 651.  I would agree that poor 
use of Socratic dialogue can increase stress, but I think that a professor who uses it properly 
and is sensitive to student concerns need not create undue stress.  Professor Glesner seems to 
agree that certain palliatives might relieve strain.  See id. at 647.  However, she and I part 
company at the point where she describes Socratic dialogue as using ―the ‗muffled use of 
threat and stress‘ to provoke learning.‖  Id. at 651 (quoting SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra 
note 42, at 214). 
54 MADELEINE SCHACHTER, THE LAW PROFESSOR‘S HANDBOOK 156 (2004). 
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likely that there will be no definitive answer to the questions the pro-
fessor raises or that students ask. 
To the extent that law school should be preparing students for 
the practice of law, both of these characteristics are appropriate.  
Lawyers need to prepare extensively for their cases.  They also have 
to know that there may be more than one outcome to the issues raised 
in their clients‘ cases, and they must be ready to assess the likelihood 
of an unfavorable outcome.  While uncertainty in dealing with an 
area that they are unfamiliar with may very well be disconcerting to 
novices to the discourse of law, this is a skill that they need exposure 
to as part of their education.  To reiterate, however, neither intense 
preparation nor lack of a definitive resolution is unique to the Socrat-
ic dialogue; they will be present anytime the professor is pushing the 
students to their limits.  Nor should it be a matter of concern that the 
students sometimes feel extensive discomfort.  In my experience at 
least, the students‘ discomfort eases substantially as they master the 
skills the professor is teaching.55 
 
55 I am not saying that faculty can afford to be oblivious to students‘ discomfort.  While a 
certain level of discomfort is unavoidable and the resulting tension can be productive, it is 
also indisputable that excessive levels of discomfort can become counterproductive.  Faculty 
need to be sensitive to that danger.  However, there are means of alleviating students‘ 
discomfort outside the classroom without becoming less demanding in the classroom.  This 
means being available to the students and convincing them that you care about them and that 
you will work with them when they have concerns. 
        Last year, I had a student who approached me after about the third week of class.  He 
told me that my style of teaching made him nervous and asked if I could either go easier on 
him or not call on him at all.  He said he was so nervous that he did not think he would be 
able to learn in class.  I talked with him at length and explained to him that I could not single 
him out for special consideration.  I also told him that anytime he felt overwhelmed or had 
questions he was free to come to my office and talk with me.  He never came to my office to 
talk to me during the course of the year, although he was always friendly when we would 
pass in the hall.  At the end of the year, he approached me in the hall and asked if he could 
talk to me.  We chatted and he said with a sheepish grin, ―You were right, Professor.  I 
learned a great deal in your class and it was due to what you demanded of us in class.‖  In 
fact, that had been clear to me before we ever had the discussion.  I had noticed that he 
voluntarily participated increasingly during the course of the year.  Although he certainly 
could not be categorized as a frequent contributor, he clearly was participating at an 
increased level. 
        This one example does not mean that every student will have the same experience with 
me or any other demanding professor.  However, it does exemplify two points.  First, 
students often underestimate their own capability and when they are pushed, they respond 
successfully.  Second, when the professor demonstrates adequate concern about the student, 
the student can be sufficiently put at ease to be able to respond effectively in a demanding 
classroom. 
17
Shaw: A Heretical View of Teaching
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
1256 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
 
My own experience in the classroom has led me to believe 
that the concept of students as novices to the discourse almost exactly 
explains the dynamic, at least in my classroom.  What I am about to 
describe is a phenomenon that takes place not only in courses in 
which I use the Socratic dialogue, but also in my Evidence class, in 
which I use a problem method.56  The fact that the same phenomenon 
occurs in both scenarios makes it clear that what is causing the dis-
comfort is the demand for excellence rather than the use of Socratic 
dialogue. 
I tell my students that they are likely to feel uncomfortable 
and intimidated at first when they start answering questions because 
they are novices to the discourse.  I explain what that means and why 
they are likely to feel intimidated.  Despite my attempts at reassur-
ance, students remain uncomfortable and intimidated until they come 
to believe that they have indeed begun to master the material to the 
level that I expect of them.  I only push students as hard as I think 
they can withstand it.  I want to challenge them to explore their lim-
its.  One result is that a significant number of students are not com-
fortable, not only because they are novices to the discourse, but be-
cause they have rarely been challenged in this manner. 
I think it is fair to say that a substantial number of them are 
substantially discomfited in a number of different ways.  Certainly, 
my student evaluations report large numbers of students saying that 
they are substantially intimidated in class.57  Invariably I have the ex-
act same discussion with students who tell me they are intimidated in 
my class.  I ask them if I am disrespectful to them personally.  They 
always reply that I do not demean them or attack them on a personal 
level.  Rather, they respond that what I want from them in terms of 
answering questions is ―scary.‖  I tell them that I am not asking any-
thing of them that will not be asked of lawyers, and they respond that 
 
        The above anecdote does not mean that faculty will always be successful in alleviating 
stress.  Every student is different, and faculty need to be sensitive to this issue.  However, it 
does demonstrate that one can push a student beyond the student‘s normal comfort zone with 
highly successful results. 
56 In Evidence, I use A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE (3d ed.), by Lempert, Gross and 
Liebman, which uses explanatory text and then a series of problems requiring the students to 
apply the relevant rule of evidence to a fact pattern. 
57 While it is worth discussing what the students say about intimidation in the student 
evaluations, student evaluations contain extremely limited value for assessing the efficacy of 
a teacher. 
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they know this is so but that it is intimidating nonetheless. 
This dichotomy between being personally attacked and hav-
ing their analyses criticized is an important one.  Telling a student 
that he or she is incapable or that an answer is stupid will undoubted-
ly be counterproductive.  However, that is a far different response 
than exploring with the student why the student‘s answer was defi-
cient and working with the student to explore the deficiencies and 
remedy them.  Certainly students may misinterpret being shown how 
their answers are deficient as personal attacks.  Alternatively, they 
may simply be embarrassed (perhaps even see themselves as having 
been humiliated) at having the class see the deficiencies in their an-
swers.  If that is the dynamic at work, however, the proper response is 
to work with the students to encourage them to explore their answers 
and not feel embarrassment. 
One can start by making a point of telling the students that 
they have no reason to feel embarrassed.  Assure the students that 
none of their classmates are laughing at them and that their class-
mates are silently saying, ―There, but for the grace of god, go I.‖  In 
other words, let the students know the reason for dissecting the stu-
dents‘ answers in such detail—that it is likely that their classmates 
share the same mistakes and that by working with one student the 
professor can help to correct the entire class‘ misunderstandings or 
misanalysis.  Encourage the students to participate by pointing out to 
them that when they participate they are in essence getting an indivi-
dualized tutorial.  Reassure them that you do not think any less of 
them because they are not flawless in their analyses and that so long 
as they make an effort, you can work with them and help them im-
prove. 
To be sure, while many students will be reassured by this lec-
ture, many students will still feel uncomfortable and will prefer not to 
participate if they can avoid it.  Yet, over the course of the semester 
students who participate become much more comfortable.  Even 
though each new section of a course introduces them to an area of 
law they are unfamiliar with, they are no longer intimidated by the 
exchange between professor and student.  They gain confidence in 
their ability to meet the demands made of them.  Even students who 
have not voluntarily participated become more willing to speak up 
19
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and are less nervous as they see that they are on the right track.58 
The above analysis is not just rationalization.  One often sees 
that by the time the students have completed a challenging course, 
they have gained substantial confidence.  One sees it in the halls or at 
student functions.  The students know they have been held to high 
standards and, even more, they have met those high standards.  The 
change in demeanor for many of these students is palpable.59 
Of course, not every student will respond the same way.  No 
one teaching style will satisfy every student in every class.  In any 
given class, there will be students who resist the entire semester.  
However, and this is crucial, in any given class there will be a sub-
stantial number of students who respond to being pushed this way, 
including many who initially resisted.  Given this dynamic, it is im-
portant to gear the class towards making the students work harder, 
even at the cost of discomfort, than to gear the class towards the stu-
dents‘ comfort.  This is not just a value judgment as to which students 
to cater to.  By addressing your teaching to the better students, you 
will force the weaker students to increase their efforts as well, thus 
improving their performance.60 
 
58 This effect by which students who have made the effort outside of the classroom gain 
confidence by comparing their answers to the answers given by their classmates is 
substantial.  Further, the existence of this effect is an important rebuttal to the claim that the 
Socratic method is an inefficient and ineffective method of teaching.  Of course, it must be 
recognized that some students may remain diffident throughout the course of the semester.  
Just as importantly, by having their analyses relentlessly challenged the students are getting 
training for the day in practice when they will receive such challenges.  This will occur 
during their careers, either from a partner who is questioning a memo the attorney has 
written or a presentation that has been made, or a judge, or opposing counsel.  Students must 
learn how to cope with such attacks and the best way to learn is to experience such 
confrontations in class.  The advantage, of course, is that the professor can gauge how the 
student is responding and guide the discussion in a productive direction, for example by 
suggesting other approaches to the problem being analyzed, rather than by simply destroying 
the student, as might happen in practice.  The experience of having every detail of an 
analysis challenged is good preparation for practice. 
59 This phenomenon is certainly not unique to the classroom.  It applies in all walks of 
life.  For example, Geoff Colvin reports that in the business world, ―[e]xecutives consistently 
report that their hardest experiences, the stretches that most challenged them, were the most 
helpful.‖  GEOFF COLVIN, TALENT IS OVERRATED 129 (2008). 
60 Of course, while theory is fine, the key is execution and successful execution requires 
judgment.  Simply deciding to teach to the better students does not determine every decision 
to be made.  If a substantial portion of the class is weaker than normal, it may be necessary 
for the teacher to reformulate the way he teaches his doctrines and the questions he raises.  
One cannot simply decide to write off a substantial portion of the class.  Alternatively, if the 
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To conclude, discomfort and embarrassment are not the same 
as humiliation.  The fact that students are novices to the discourse is 
what makes them uncomfortable, not the use of the Socratic dialogue.  
Discomfort will exist, or should exist, regardless of the teaching me-
thod used.  Blaming student discomfort on the Socratic dialogue is 
misguided.  To be sure, a faculty member can misuse the Socratic di-
alogue to a substantial negative effect.  Certainly, a professor who in-
tends to embarrass a student for embarrassment‘s sake should not be 
classified as a good teacher.  However, the negative results occurring 
as a result of these sorts of teaching practices are not a reflection of 
the inappropriateness of Socratic dialogue; rather they are examples 
of bad teaching.  Throwing out the Socratic dialogue because there 
are professors who use it poorly throws the baby out with the bath 
water. 
 
2. Arguments that the Socratic Dialogue Leads 
to a Skewed, Oversimplified Vision of 
Lawyers’ Roles are Inaccurate 
The second basis of criticism of the Socratic dialogue centers 
on the fact that the first year curriculum relies primarily on appellate 
and trial court opinions as source material.  The essence of the criti-
cism focuses on the fact that opinions by their very nature are artifi-
cially simple, and the edited versions found in casebooks are even 
simpler.  It is argued that these opinions give students an inaccurate 
and oversimplified view of the world of law practice, focus the stu-
dents inappropriately on litigation and common law, and are an inef-
ficient means of transmitting information. 
I argue that such criticism is not an innate function of apply-
ing Socratic dialogue to appellate and trial opinions.  To the contrary, 
the fact that appellate and trial court opinions are simplified is a vir-
tue rather than a vice.  The ability to read, analyze, and synthesize 
cases is a foundational skill for the other skills that law students ulti-
mately need to master.  By using materials that place concerns such 
as fact-finding, negotiating, and counseling as secondary, it allows 
 
class is better than average, one may find himself asking even more difficult questions than 
he normally would.  As always, good teaching requires judgment in applying a rule. 
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students to focus on the foundational skills that are necessary for 
them to master the higher level skills that are necessary to be effec-
tive lawyers.  Further, nothing in the use of court opinions precludes 
faculty from emphasizing the breadth of law practice.  To the extent 
that using case law as the subject of Socratic dialogue may result in 
the students receiving a skewed, oversimplified vision of the lawyers‘ 
functions, this is again the result of ineffective teaching rather than an 
innate flaw in the Socratic dialogue. 
Best Practices provides an effective summary of the alleged 
deficiencies of the Socratic dialogue as used with case law, quoting 
Professor John Elson.61  It then supplements this summary with criti-
ques from other law review articles that coincide with Professor El-
son‘s assessment of the Socratic dialogue.  Professor Elson views 
each of his criticisms as an intrinsic shortcoming of the Socratic di-
alogue; I view each of the criticisms as being a function of a profes-
sor who utilizes the Socratic dialogue inartfully at best and badly at 
worst.  If a professor truly taught the way that Professor Elson de-
scribes, the Socratic dialogue could lead to some of the shortcomings 
Elson and others describe.  However, such a teaching method would 
be the hallmark of a poor, or perhaps inexperienced, professor.  There 
is nothing intrinsic to the Socratic dialogue that requires a professor 
to teach in the manner that Professor Elson describes. 
Elson‘s first criticism of the Socratic dialogue is that 
        Appellate opinions‘ reduction of the real world of 
factual complexity and indeterminacy into a set of 
seemingly clear-cut, independent variables which ap-
pear to foreordain the outcome of cases conveys an in-
accurate sense of the indeterminacy and manipulabili-
ty of the factual reality that lawyers must organize and 
create.  The case method‘s formal criteria for analyz-
ing and distinguishing cases are necessary elements of 
 
61 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 136-37.  The critique comes from Elson‘s article, in 
which he evaluates the likelihood that the recommendations of the MacCrate Report would 
be implemented.  Elson concluded that it was unlikely that the recommendations would be 
effectuated and that other reforms would be necessary in order to improve the quality of 
legal education.  John Elson, The Regulation of Legal Education: The Potential for 
Implementing the MacCrate Report’s Recommendation for Curricular Reform, 1 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 363, 384 (1994).  Among these reforms was movement away from Socratic dialogue 
for the reasons which Best Practices cites.  Id. 
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lawyering that students must master to become effec-
tive practitioners.  Nevertheless, when that methodol-
ogy is applied outside the context of a problem        
situation, it distorts students‘ understanding of how 
lawyers actually analyze cases in order to achieve their 
goals. . . . By repeatedly leading students through a 
highly routinized set of analytical rules and distinc-
tions, the traditional case method tends to dampen cre-
ative problem-solving by instilling an essentially pas-
sive thought process, one that is inflexible and ill-
suited to the inchoate factual world lawyers must ac-
tively try to manipulate.62 
 
  Although Professor Elson is accurate in some aspects of his 
discussion of the use of appellate opinions as a teaching tool, he 
makes two major errors.  First, he seriously mischaracterizes how 
good teachers use appellate opinions to teach students.  Second, he 
implies that teachers using Socratic dialogue never venture beyond 
the four corners of the cases they teach. 
Appellate opinions (and trial court opinions) are an excellent 
tool for teaching law students the fundamental skills they will need to 
build upon, and good teachers use appellate opinions for a variety of 
purposes.  First, appellate opinions take a complex area that needs to 
be mastered and break that complexity down to manageable pieces 
that can be mastered by a student.  As the Carnegie Report and Best 
Practices properly point out, becoming a good lawyer requires mas-
tering a large number of complex skills.  While one approach to 
teaching students mastery of these skills is to simply expose them to 
all the issues involved and let them try to master each skill simulta-
neously (the sink or swim method), the use of Socratic dialogue al-
lows the professor to introduce skills serially instead, allowing stu-
dents to become familiar with each skill and at least start down the 
road to mastery before starting on the next skill. 
Appellate opinions allow the professor to start with the skill 
that underlies everything a lawyer hopes to accomplish for his or her 
clients—the ability to master legal analysis.  At a minimum, students 
 
62 Elson, supra note 61, at 384. 
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need to be able to analyze cases and be able to synthesize the rule of 
law from a series of cases, which includes the ability to understand 
what the rule of law has been, how it has changed, and in what direc-
tion the law may be heading in the future.  While mastering common 
law analysis is hardly the be-all and end-all of legal analysis, com-
mon law analysis provides an intellectual underpinning for students 
to move on to other skills.  It is crucial for students to be able to de-
termine what the relevant rule of law is, what the relevant facts are, 
and how the rule should apply to the facts.  The criticism that use of 
appellate opinions does not teach the students anything about the fac-
tual complexity and indeterminacy of the cases they will handle as 
lawyers is inappropriate when applied to new students.  Appellate 
opinions are a way to start students on the road to mastering the rela-
tionship of facts and law.  They can concentrate on that first skill be-
fore moving on to another skill—how to handle factual complexity 
and indeterminacy.  As students master the initial skill of relating 
facts and law, the faculty member then has the opportunity to intro-
duce the student to the many-faceted issues involved in fact discovery 
in actual cases. 
What is crucial to realize is that as students master the skills, 
good faculty continue to push them to new limits.  The depth to 
which one explores a case with first week law students, as well as the 
emphasis the professor puts on various aspects of the case, must in-
evitably differ from the depth and emphasis that the professor con-
centrates on later in the semester, as well as the progression through 
the entire first year.  As students‘ mastery of legal analysis improves, 
faculty start reaching for more complex analyses of the law as well as 
introducing new skill sets.  To characterize the Socratic dialogue as 
―repeatedly leading students through a highly routinized set of analyt-
ical rules and distinctions‖ either describes a poor teacher or misde-
scribes the process of learning that takes place under Socratic dialo-
gue.63  Not only is there nothing in the Socratic dialogue that requires 
routinization, the need for thoughtful faculty to monitor and recog-
nize their students‘ progress precludes such a routinization. 
There is a profound difference between repetition for the sake 
of learning and routinization.  Repetition of a skill is crucial to learn-
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comes so proficient in exercising that skill that the exercise becomes 
routine; that is to say engaging in such analysis becomes second na-
ture.  Once it has become second nature, the student can focus on 
mastering other skills.  So while engaging in legal analysis of the sort 
engendered by Socratic dialogue may become routine for the student, 
that does not mean that the professor should let it be routine as far as 
what he or she teaches. 
Elson is even further in error when he characterizes the tradi-
tional case method as ―instilling an essentially passive thought 
process, one that is inflexible and ill-suited to the inchoate factual 
world lawyers must actively try to manipulate.‖64  It is certainly poss-
ible for a teacher to use the Socratic dialogue in such a manner that 
students will start to think mechanically.  If a professor assigns the 
students the mere task of reading and briefing a case in sufficient de-
tail that they can identify the relevant facts, procedure, issue, holding, 
and reasoning to the professor‘s satisfaction, then students may well 
start to think passively.  However, the Socratic dialogue does not re-
quire that the analysis of the case stop at the four corners of the case.  
The four corners of the case are merely a starting point for deeper 
analysis of the law—a task that, if done correctly, requires active 
thought from the students.65 
In essence, the entirety of Elson‘s criticism so far is based on 
a supposition of ineffective teaching by a professor using the me-
thod.66  Nothing in Socratic dialogue intrinsically forces a professor 
 
64 Id. 
65 There are undoubtedly many ways by which a professor can achieve this goal.  One 
method that works extremely well is to ask one question repeatedly: ―Why?‖  When the 
student answers a question with a conclusion as part of the response, ask the student why he 
or she reached the conclusion.  It does not have to literally be the word ―why.‖  One can ask 
the student what led him or her to reach that conclusion.  The response will almost always 
have an aspect that contains a conclusion.  Point out that conclusory aspect and again ask the 
student what led him or her to reach that conclusion.  Keep working backward in that 
respect.  At some point you will reach the beginning of the student‘s argument.  Then the 
professor can explore the flaws in the reasoning as well as why they lead to the results 
reached.  The technique is not only useful for pointing out flaws in a student‘s analysis but 
also allows the professor to show the student the assumptions that may underlie his or her 
conclusions.  The professor can then ask what happens if the assumptions are changed.  
Further, this can lead into a discussion of which assumption(s) are appropriate and why. 
66 There is accuracy to Elson‘s claim that Socratic dialogue is not an ideal method of 
preparing students for the ―inchoate factual world‖ that lawyers need to deal with.  However, 
mastery of legal analysis is a foundational skill, without which students cannot make 
determinations about which facts are important.  In other words, in trying to discover those 
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to teach it in the style described by Elson, and skillful teachers do not 
teach it in such a manner.  The Carnegie Report notes that in the 
hands of skillful teachers, Socratic dialogue is very effective, not only 
in teaching legal analysis but also in ―gradually reshaping students 
into legal professionals.‖67 
Elson‘s second criticism of Socratic dialogue is that:  
The case method is an inefficient and, often hapha-
zard, way to convey to students the doctrinal know-
ledge that is necessary for effective problem-solving 
and the ways lawyers must identify and acquire the 
doctrinal knowledge they will need to solve problems 
in unfamiliar areas.68 
Elson is not the only one to make that charge.  Best Practices 
also cites Michael Schwartz among others as arguing that ― ‗law 
teaching is neither effective, efficient, nor appealing . . . .‘ ‖69  Of 
course, the ubiquity of such a charge does not make it true. 
The accuracy of the charge will depend on what the professor 
is trying to achieve.  If the primary purpose of the professor is the 
transmission of information, then the charge certainly rings true; 
there are more effective modes for transmitting information.  Howev-
er, the purpose of using Socratic dialogue is far broader than the 
transmission of information.  The primary purpose must be teaching 
students how to teach themselves the law.70  Once they have mastered 
that skill, their ability to teach themselves the law will enable them to 
learn what they need to know in order to help their clients.  In other 
words, the ability to teach themselves the law is foundational.  It must 
be mastered before it is possible for students to start mastering other 
skills.  I have no dispute with advocates of clinical education who ar-
 
inchoate facts, they will have no idea what it is they need to look for.  So while it is true that 
additional teaching methods are necessary to foster some skills that lawyers will need in 
practice, this criticism fails to establish the inappropriateness of the Socratic method for the 
purpose of establishing the necessary foundation for students to efficiently and effectively 
search for inchoate facts. 
67 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 75. 
68 Elson, supra note 61, at 384. 
69 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 136 (quoting Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law 
by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design Can inform and Reform Law 
Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 358 (2001)). 
70 See D‘Amato, supra note 49, at 465 (describing how a hypothetical professor, 
―Professor Smith,‖ can ―teach his students to teach themselves the law‖). 
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gue that exposure to clients should be part of a law student‘s educa-
tion.  However, that experience cannot be truly fruitful without mas-
tery of the foundational skill of learning how to learn the law. 
Crucially, students cannot master how to learn the law with-
out an exploration of how they think; in other words, they must mas-
ter metacognition.  Metacognition is one‘s knowledge regarding how 
his or her own cognitive processes work with respect to learning from 
information or data.71  Socratic dialogue is well-suited to this pur-
pose. 
The purpose of Socratic dialogue is to teach students to ―think 
like a lawyer.‖  Leaving aside the ambiguities inherent in what it 
means to ―think like a lawyer,‖72 a critical component of mastering 
this skill is understanding how one thinks.73  While it is undoubtedly 
true that individuals reach conclusions differently, it is also true that 
there are similarities in the way that people think.74  Socratic dialogue 
can be tremendously effective in teaching students how to think about 
problems.  The key here is to understand that the scope of Socratic 
dialogue not only applies inside the classroom but that it also extends 
beyond the classroom.  Used effectively, Socratic dialogue allows the 
professor to use one student as a surrogate to explore many students‘ 
thought processes.  This works on two different levels.  First, with re-
spect to the student called on to recite, the professor gets insights into 
that student‘s thought processes.  By focusing on the student‘s analy-
sis, the professor is capable of exploring how the student thinks and 
where the flaws lie, not only in the student‘s analysis as he or she 
presented it to the class but also in the student‘s thought processes.  
Working with the student, the professor then can correct the flaws 
and perhaps even model a scheme that will allow the student to im-
prove his or her approach to the material. 
 
71 Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active-Learning Techniques and Metacognition in Law 
School: Shifting Energy from Professor to Student, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 7 (2003). 
72 The Carnegie Report sets forth a good exposition of what this entails.  SULLIVAN ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 51-54. 
73 I am not talking about the differences in learning styles.  Students learn in a variety of 
ways.  Regardless of their learning styles, students must come to understand how they 
think—what presumptions they start with and how they proceed from those assumptions 
through application of the law to the facts and ultimately reach a conclusion.  Once students 
understand their own thought processes, they can assess the validity of their analyses at each 
step. 
74 See DANIEL T. WILLINGHAM, WHY DON‘T STUDENTS LIKE SCHOOL 113 (2009). 
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While the professor is working with an individual student, the 
teaching will extend to many more students.  This can happen in a va-
riety of ways.  First, if the student is thoughtful in his or her res-
ponses, the odds are that many students reached similar or different 
conclusions using similar reasoning.  Thus, by exploring one stu-
dent‘s thought processes, the professor reaches many students.  In 
addition, the professor can ask other students to join in the analysis.  
Comparing and contrasting the thought processes of one student with 
another is likely to reach many more students and give them insight 
into their own thought processes.  Used in this manner, Socratic di-
alogue is a time-tested method of exploring students‘ reasoning in a 
way that helps to illuminate the thought processes of other students as 
well as the students called upon.  It must again be emphasized that 
the reason for exploring students‘ thought processes is to help them 
learn how to learn the law, the primary foundational skill without 
which the other skills students will learn are meaningless. 
Of course, the key to the efficacy of this approach is though-
tful questioning on the part of the professor.  If the professor is mere-
ly asking questions for the purpose of hectoring the student or show-
ing the student that no matter what he or she answers, the professor is 
capable of finding flaws in the answer, then the students called upon 
will legitimately become resentful, and the other students in the class 
are likely to learn little about either the called-upon student‘s thought 
processes or their own. 
Asking students questions for the purpose of hectoring them 
or showing the professor‘s superior skills is simply bad teaching.  
The teacher‘s inefficacy in such a situation is not the result of some 
inherent flaw in Socratic dialogue; it is a function of the teacher‘s mi-
suse of the method or the professor‘s general ineptitude or though-
tlessness.  Ineptitude will render any approach to teaching inefficient.  
It is inappropriate to disparage Socratic dialogue based on a presump-
tion that its practitioners will not use it properly. 
In addition to using Socratic dialogue in the classroom to 
reach the entire class, it can be used outside the classroom to the 
same effect.  The teacher need only give thoughtful assignments for 
the students to work on between classes.  One can assign cases for his 
or her students to read and tell them that class will start with particu-
lar questions designed to ensure that they have thought about a par-
ticular point.  One can direct the students by telling them that they 
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need to approach the question from a particular perspective.  One can 
also encourage them to discuss the questions together either online or 
physically together.  When students take these assignments seriously 
(and unfortunately they do not all do so), it allows them to engage in 
their own methods of analysis, whether it is Socratic dialogue or oth-
erwise.  This interaction, of course, is the best means of teaching 
them metacognition—by getting each of them individually to explore 
how they think.75  For this to work, the professor must give though-
tful assignments, not just assign reading for the next class.  None of 
this is inconsistent with the use of Socratic dialogue. 
In conclusion, Elson‘s second criticism deals with a flaw re-
sulting from bad teaching, not any flaw intrinsic in Socratic dialogue.  
A professor whose primary goal is transmission of information and 
decides to use Socratic dialogue is probably using a less effective me-
thod than might otherwise be available.  When Socratic dialogue is 
used for the proper purpose—teaching students how to learn the 
law—and utilized thoughtfully, it is an effective, efficient means of 
teaching students in a classroom.76 
Elson‘s third criticism of Socratic dialogue is that: 
        The case method is also an ineffective, and likely 
misleading, approach toward helping students under-
stand the underlying social forces that are interacting 
 
75 The reader may have already noticed that this is just another example of the fact that 
work outside of the classroom is what is truly useful in students mastering the appropriate 
material.  In this instance, the professor is telling the students they must master the material 
so as to be able to respond to a particular line of questioning they are likely to see as lawyers.  
However, because the professor has guided the students as to what the professor wants them 
to master, the students are able to use whatever methods work best for them in preparing for 
the assignment.  Again, the key is that the professor requires the students to master a 
particular skill, but by giving guided assignments the students may use whatever works best 
for them individually to master that skill. 
76 There is one last aspect to the criticism of Socratic dialogue as inefficient.  There is 
undoubtedly a class size at which Socratic dialogue fails to work effectively.  I am fortunate 
to work at a school where the largest class I have had to deal with is probably seventy-five 
people.  I think that is stretching the limits at which Socratic dialogue can be usefully 
employed.  However, above that limit I am not convinced that any method of teaching is 
particularly effective, especially if the purpose of the class is to teach students how to think, 
rather than transmission of information.  Further, none of the suggestions made in the 
Carnegie Report or Best Practices is conducive to large classes.  Therefore, class size is not 
really relevant to a discussion of the efficiency of Socratic dialogue.  If the classes are too 
large, no method of teaching students how to think will be efficient.  If the classes are small, 
then Socratic dialogue is an efficient method. 
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to determine the outcome of events in a field of law.  
This misplaced focus on caselaw as the primary me-
dium for understanding the dynamic of an area of 
practice retards students‘ ability to develop an effec-
tive approach toward practice.77 
This description of Socratic dialogue is extremely myopic.  
There is nothing about Socratic dialogue that requires such an ap-
proach to teaching this material.  Such an approach would be more 
indicative of the deficiencies of the professor rather than the material.  
It is possible to teach using Socratic dialogue without going beyond 
the four corners of the case but there is nothing intrinsic to Socratic 
dialogue that restricts professors to the four corners of the case.  In 
fact, in many cases, the decisions themselves contain discussion of 
the social forces that have led the court to reach the decision that it 
has reached.  Not only does the case itself discuss the social forces 
leading it to its decision, it creates a wonderful starting point for a 
more detailed discussion of relevant social developments and how 
they interact with the law. 
It is true that many cases do not have a discussion of social 
forces as part of the analysis.  However, in those cases in which the 
professor thinks that such a discussion is necessary, there is nothing 
that precludes the professor from introducing additional material into 
the discussion.  This can be done by assigning additional material for 
the students to read, providing such information during the discussion 
of the case, or through the students‘ introduction of material during 
the discussion.  This last method, student introduction of material, is 
likely to occur regardless of whether the professor intended it to oc-
cur or not if the professor has created an atmosphere where student 
participation is encouraged.78 
It is true that the casebook or cases that a professor chooses to 
use may require the professor to do independent research to augment 
the cases.  However, this can hardly be an unexpected or onerous 
burden on the professor.  Certainly it is appropriate to expect that a 
 
77 Elson, supra note 61, at 384. 
78 I want to emphasize there is nothing intrinsic in Socratic dialogue that precludes 
creation of an atmosphere where student participation is encouraged.  Creation of such an 
atmosphere is a function of the professor‘s relationship with the students in and out of the 
classroom. 
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professor dedicated to being a good teacher will seek out materials 
beyond what is in the casebook.  I would go further.  I would say that 
a professor who does not seek out materials beyond what is in the ca-
sebook is shortchanging the students and is not to be described as a 
professor whose teaching style should be endorsed or emulated.  I 
will suggest, however, that such faculty are rare.79 
As with Elson‘s prior criticisms, his concern is a function of 
poor teaching, not anything intrinsic in Socratic dialogue.  This dis-
cussion of myopic professors leads directly into Elson‘s fourth criti-
cism, that: 
        The teachers who rely principally on case books 
to develop an understanding of, and a pedagogical ap-
proach to, a field of law are being distracted from en-
gaging in readings and experiences that will give them 
a more coherent and penetrating vision of the social 
and legal processes that are governing the field.80 
This criticism is purely a strawman and truly does not merit 
extended discussion.  Teachers who would rely on such a limited un-
iverse to gain expertise in the fields of law that they teach lack the 
kind of intellectual curiosity that would make them good teachers.  
Their lack of intellectual curiosity will make them poor teachers re-
gardless of what method they choose to use.  In other words, whatev-
er ineffectiveness a teacher displays using Socratic dialogue will be a 
function of the professor‘s skill or attitude towards teaching, not a 
function of the fact that the professor uses Socratic dialogue.81 
 
79 There is one potential exception that I would make to this rule.  If a professor is asked 
at a late time to teach a course outside his or her area of interest or expertise, time constraints 
may result in the professor simply using the casebook without going beyond.  I have no 
doubt that this will lead to a less educational experience for a class than if the professor had 
expertise in the area.  Even this is mitigated by the presence of teacher‘s manuals for many 
casebooks.  Many teacher‘s manuals suggest areas for discussion beyond what the cases 
provide.  In any event, the lesser educational experience is a function of the professor‘s lack 
of expertise, not his or her choice of Socratic dialogue as the means of teaching.  Regardless 
of what materials the professor chose, he or she would be limited to the perspective provided 
by the materials he or she chose.  While a professor might choose materials with a broader 
perspective than that provided by a casebook, there is likely to be trade-off in the depth of 
the material covered. 
80 Elson, supra note 61, at 384. 
81 The one scenario in which a professor might not show great intellectual curiosity in the 
course he or she is teaching is a situation where, because of curricular needs, the school 
requires the professor to teach a course in an area he or she has no interest in.  In such a 
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Elson‘s final criticism is that: 
        The case method‘s exclusive focus on the out-
comes of litigation diverts students‘ attention from the 
many other arenas of lawyering with which competent 
practitioners should be familiar, such as alternative 
dispute resolution, administrative practice, legislative 
advocacy and client counseling.82 
If law schools taught solely through Socratic dialogue, this 
criticism might have merit.  However, as discussed earlier, this simp-
ly is not the case.83   
In conclusion, none of the perceived flaws in the use of the 
Socratic dialogue as it is applied to case law is intrinsic to the Socrat-
ic dialogue.  Rather to the extent that these problems exist, they arise 
from ineffective teaching. 
B. The Socratic Dialogue’s Emphasis on Rationality 
over Emotion is Not a Drawback but Rather a 
Strength of the Method 
While the criticisms in the previous section should have been 
recognized as being inappropriately attributed to the use of Socratic 
dialogue, the criticism in this section is not so easily pigeonholed.  
Best Practices, as part of its criticism, states that: 
        Law students get the message, early and often, 
that what they believe, or believed, at their core is un-
important—in fact ―irrelevant‖ and inappropriate in 
the context of legal discourse—and their traditional 
ways of thinking and feeling are wholly unequal to the 
task before them.84 
The Carnegie Report also shows concern that, in the interests of en-
hancing students‘ adeptness at legal reasoning, Socratic dialogue ―of-
 
situation, a professor might be loath to invest a great deal of effort in an area he or she hopes 
to eventually stop teaching.  In such a scenario, the comparatively ineffectual teaching that 
will result is a function of a less than optimal logistical situation rather than a result of the 
system the professor chooses to use in the course that he or she really does not want to teach. 
82 Elson, supra note 61, at 384. 
83 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
84 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 139. 
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ten forces students to separate their sense of justice and fairness from 
their understanding of the requirements of legal procedure and doc-
trine.‖85  Stated another way, Socratic dialogue is criticized as em-
phasizing rationality ―at the expense of students‘ emotions, feelings, 
and values,‖ with the result that ―students‘ moral compasses [are set] 
adrift on a sea of [moral] relativism, in which all positions are viewed 
as ‗defensible‘ or ‗arguable‘ and none as ‗right‘ or ‗just,‘ and they 
train students who recognize and regret these developments in them-
selves to put those feelings aside as nothing more than counter-
productive relics from their pre-law lives.‖86 
Part of this criticism—that students may be led to believe that 
the law is just about taking positions and that lawyers are essentially 
just ―hired guns‖—is, as the previous criticisms were, inaccurate in 
that it attributes consequences of bad teaching to Socratic dialogue.  
The other part of this criticism—that Socratic dialogue emphasizes 
rationality over emotion—is an accurate observation but is wrong in 
the conclusions it draws about the wisdom of this characteristic of 
Socratic dialogue. 
Initially, there is some validity to the criticism that Socratic 
dialogue may lead new law students to the conclusion that the func-
tion of the lawyer is to be able to create arguments for any client who 
hires the lawyer, and therefore the lawyer is a hired gun who should 
not take into account other interests in counseling a client.  If a pro-
fessor is not sensitive to this issue, the emphasis on creating argu-
ments without an equal emphasis on the reason for this skill might 
easily mislead a novice to the discourse of the law to misinterpret the 
role of a lawyer as being a hired gun.  However, this problem is easi-
ly remedied.  The professor need only explain the reasons for empha-
sizing the students‘ ability to create an argument on either side.  
These reasons are the bases underlying my claim that the Socratic di-
alogue‘s emphasis on rationality is a strength of the method. 
First, students need to understand that different people may 
have differing ideas of what is ―right‖ or ―just.‖  Therefore, where 
there is a dispute, the other side will be able to formulate an argument 
to support that other side‘s position.  Second, in order to rebut the 
other side‘s argument, lawyers must understand the other side‘s ar-
 
85 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 57. 
86 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 139-40 (quoting Krieger, supra note 38, at 125). 
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gument at least as well as they understand their own arguments.  In 
other words, professors need to make students aware of a tenet that 
lawyers take for granted—that one needs to know the other side‘s ar-
gument at least as well as one knows his or her own argument. 
Professors must do more than make students aware of this te-
net; professors must ensure that students make this tenet part of their 
mental machinery.87  That means that professors must emphasize 
both elements set forth above—that reasonable people can differ on 
what is right and just and no one has a monopoly on this and that the 
ability to understand the other side‘s argument—no, formulate the 
other side‘s argument—is crucial to being an effective advocate for 
your client.88 
The observation that Socratic dialogue emphasizes rational 
thought and deemphasizes emotion is accurate.  However, far from 
this being an undesirable trait, as critics claim, it is this emphasis on 
rationality that makes it so effective and valuable.  As stated earlier, 
 
87 See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
88 Fortunately, it is not difficult to set the right tone.  All the professor needs to do is 
explain to the students why he or she is emphasizing the need to explore all sides of the 
argument and be able to formulate arguments for a side the student may disagree with.  Let 
me give an example.  Recently in my Constitutional Law class, we were dealing with the 
doctrine of state action, more specifically when private actors‘ actions are attributable to the 
State.  After analyzing three cases, I asked the students to synthesize the cases and give me 
the answer to a hypothetical I posed.  I started by asking what argument the students would 
make for a finding that the private actor‘s action would be attributable to the State.  One 
student took the lead, and I worked with him for about fifteen minutes.  After he had 
formulated the argument, I asked him what argument he should make to convince the court 
that the action should not be attributable to the State.  The student (and the class) looked 
surprised that such an argument could be made.  Ultimately, the class formulated the 
necessary argument.  Immediately, the inevitable question arose—what was the correct 
answer? 
It was at that point that I stated that the key to the exercise was not to demonstrate 
that there was no definitive answer nor was it to point out that arguments could be made on 
both sides.  Rather, the point was that the students needed to be able to see both arguments 
so as to be able to decide for themselves which was the better argument and most 
importantly, to be able to defend their conclusion against attack from the other side.  This 
answer was intentionally designed to dispel the ―hired gun‖ syndrome and to fit the entire 
exercise within a context that would emphasize what attorneys do.  As I glanced around, the 
students seemed to have gotten the message; after all, it is a message I repeat consistently 
throughout the year with them. 
                Earlier on in my career, I did not emphasize this point.  Indeed, I did not even 
think of the concern that I might be inculcating ―hired gun‖ syndrome.  It was only with the 
passage of time and research into teaching methods that I became aware.  The point to be 
made is that the criticisms attributed to Socratic dialogue are not intrinsic to Socratic 
dialogue; rather they are a function of a teacher‘s skill. 
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lawyers take it as a given that they need to understand the opposing 
arguments at least as well as they understand their own.  Students, 
however, need to embrace this concept. 
Mastering the ability to understand that reasonable people can 
differ on what is right and just as well as the ability to understand the 
other side‘s argument requires the student to move beyond himself or 
herself to a broader world.  It is not sufficient for the student to have 
a passionate sense of right and wrong.  It is not sufficient for a stu-
dent to have a passionate sense of justice.  The students must under-
stand that there are other justifiable positions than the students‘ own 
positions, regardless of how passionately the students are committed 
to those positions.  This requires the students to move beyond them-
selves.  This task may be difficult for many of them, especially if it 
challenges beliefs they are passionately committed to. 
The ability to understand the counterarguments to one‘s posi-
tion requires one to dissociate himself or herself from an emotional 
attachment to that original position.  It requires the student to be able 
to dispassionately look at his or her argument and see the potential 
flaws and weaknesses in it.  It requires the student to be able to de-
termine what presumptions underlie the argument and determine how 
and why those presumptions might be subject to challenge.  In other 
words, it requires a student to be able to ruthlessly explore the validi-
ty of his or her reasoning and honestly and accurately assess that rea-
soning, including facing the potential consequence that his or her rea-
soning was wrong.  It requires the student to acquire metacognitive 
skills—the ability to understand his or her thought processes—so that 
the student may trace them and explore their truth or falsity. 
I am not saying that students should not have opinions about 
the law or that their opinions should not have an emotional compo-
nent.  However, it is critical for students to be taught that just because 
they ―feel‖ a certain way does not shelter that feeling or opinion from 
being analyzed as to whether it is defensible from an analytical 
standpoint.  In fact, it is absolutely critical that students be weaned 
away from feeling that because they feel a certain way that makes 
their position impregnable to argument.  As Madeleine Schachter re-
cognizes, when an opinion is rooted in emotion, counterarguments 
will have no effect on such an opinion.  When an opinion ―rests sole-
ly on feeling, the worse it fares in argumentative contest, the more 
persuaded its adherents are that their feelings must have some deeper 
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ground, which the arguments do not reach.‖89  In other words, the 
students‘ emphasis on emotion and feelings is entirely counterpro-
ductive to his or her mastery of analytic thinking, a key skill neces-
sary to being an effective lawyer. 
Most importantly, mastery of the ability to dispassionately as-
sess one‘s case rationally allows the student to more effectively plead 
the case with passion.  Only after the case has been analyzed tho-
roughly from a dispassionate perspective can a lawyer determine 
what points to emphasize and how strongly to emphasize those par-
ticular points.  In other words, an emphasis on dispassionate analysis, 
which forces a student to question what he or she has taken for 
granted, is not incompatible with teaching students the need for pas-
sion in their practice of law.  In fact, it enhances it.  However, this 
enhancement cannot take place without mastery of the ability to step 
back and look at a case rationally.  If students are weak with respect 
to this skill, then students must practice it until it is mastered.  That 
requires emphasis on this particular skill. 
 
C. The Argument that Rationality Should be De-
emphasized in the First Year is Wrong and Such 
De-emphasis Would be Counterproductive 
The question then becomes, ―What should schools emphasize 
early in the curriculum?‖  Should there be heavy emphasis on the 
analytic mode of thinking or should there be more of a sharing of the 
emphasis on narrative modes as well as the analytic mode?  For me, 
the answer is clear; there must initially be heavy emphasis on the ana-
lytic mode.  Only after the students have begun to master the analytic 
mode can the narrative mode be meaningfully introduced. 
The ability to think analytically—to conceptualize, establish 
cause and effect, rank, order, and find logical relationships of inclu-
sion and exclusion—is a necessary, although not sufficient compo-
nent of being a good lawyer.  Unfortunately, many students now en-
ter law school sadly deficient in these skills.90  The students are not to 
 
89 MADELEINE SCHACHTER, THE LAW PROFESSOR‘S HANDBOOK 157 (2004) (quoting JOHN 
STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869)). 
90 Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the Millennium: The Law School, the Research 
University, and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1965, 1972 
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blame.  This is a function of the education that they have received.  
Numerous books describe the shift in American educational emphasis 
from rigorous academic standards to a predominant focus on their 
feelings.91 
The result is that many, if not most, students entering law 
school today are ready to focus on what they feel or believe the an-
swers should be, rather than being ready to explore the material with 
an eye towards the analytic thinking of conceptualization and logic.  
One readily sees this in the criticism of Socratic dialogue by Krieger 
referenced to earlier in which he states that students ―regret these de-
velopments in themselves to put those feelings aside as nothing more 
than counter-productive relics from their pre-law lives.‖92 
Students come to law school well versed in the skill of stating 
their opinions.  They come to school far less capable of analytic 
skills.93  Thus, far more emphasis must be placed on developing their 
analytic skills.  While students‘ emotions or intuitions may lead them 
in the correct direction, without analytic skills students will never be 
able to explain the propriety of those feelings persuasively.  The 
 
(1999). 
[M]any law students may begin their legal education with rather limited 
motivations, aptitudes, or experiences in several intellectual activities 
that are preconditions for successful learning in the case method/final 
examination system.  These activities include: the careful, critical, im-
aginative reading of complicated texts, the contemplation of ethical 
questions—as presented by literature, philosophy, or the social 
sciences—and the writing coherent texts on complex subjects in ways 
that depend on a process of rereading both the text one is writing and 
one‘s subject texts; obtaining feedback from these rereadings; and relen-
tlessly rethinking, revising, and rewriting texts. 
Id.  Professor Kissam and I come to different conclusions on what consequences flow from 
this diminution in entering students‘ skills.  He believes that this requires restructuring the 
curriculum while I believe it increases the need for effective teaching with respect to these 
skills, which is done effectively through the use of Socratic dialogue. 
91 Two excellent books that not only describe the shift in focus in schools but also set 
forth the negative effects resulting from this shift are MAUREEN STOUT, THE FEEL-GOOD 
CURRICULUM: THE DUMBING DOWN OF AMERICA‘S KIDS IN THE NAME OF SELF-ESTEEM (2000) 
and JEAN M. TWENGE, GENERATION ME (2006). 
92 Krieger, supra note 38, at 117. 
93 See Michael Jordan, Law Teachers and the Educational Continuum, 5 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 41, 67 (1996) (arguing that pre-law school education trains students to be 
passive consumers of education, ―predisposed to accept, in fact, demand the type of 
education that nurtures [passivity]‖).  Jordan goes on to state that ―[w]hat is not demanded, 
and may even be met with hostility, is the effort to develop analytical skills.‖  Id. 
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ability to persuade, of course, is an essential part of being a lawyer. 
Mastering analytic skills requires a student to be dispassionate 
in analyzing cases.  If the professor knows that students are weak in a 
particular skill, it is the professor‘s duty to work with the students to 
increase their mastery of that skill.  If large numbers of entering stu-
dents are weak at analytic skills, then professors must emphasize ana-
lytic skills so that students‘ mastery increases, even if it means de-
emphasizing the students‘ feelings for a substantial period of time.  
Students simply must master the ability to approach a problem dis-
passionately.  If they are allowed to simply follow their feelings, they 
will not reach the same level of depth of analysis.  They will just as-
sume they are right without adequately questioning why they felt the 
way they did in the first place.  To ask a student to support the posi-
tion he or she feels is right requires a great deal of introspection and 
self-knowledge on the part of the student, which he or she often 
lacks.  A good professor will force the student into that introspection. 
Of course, questioning which forces a student to explore be-
liefs that may be deeply held often makes the student uncomfortable 
and may indeed lead the student to believe that the professor is disa-
greeing with the student‘s basic beliefs.94  Nonetheless, the professor 
must force the student to confront the issues. 
It is crucial that we challenge our students‘ beliefs, even their 
most cherished ones, not for the purpose of destroying them or show-
ing them they are worthless but rather so that they can learn how to 
defend them if they are worth defending.  That requires sensitivity on 
our part as teachers.  We must let them know that these challenges 
(which they may well view as attacks) are for the purpose of educa-
tion and that these challenges are for the purpose of improving their 
ability to explicate their reasons for their beliefs.  While it will make 
the students feel uncomfortable (because they are novices to this dis-
course), it must be done.  It is not permissible for students to defend 
themselves with ―that‘s the way I feel.‖  While feelings may be valu-
able as guideposts to what is correct, they are not infallible.  Students 
 
94 It is up to the professor to be sufficiently aware of this problem and to address it with 
any particular student or the entire class.  It is the reason I often require my students to take a 
side on an exam that I know they will disagree with.  It is actually a favor to them because it 
forces them to think the material through instead of just being conclusory in their answers 
because they assume (subconsciously) that the answer is obvious instead of working through 
all the necessary steps. 
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cannot be allowed to cut off speech by simply using feelings as some 
sort of trump card.  To students who are used to just being able to 
give a justification of ―that‘s how I feel,‖ this may feel harsh.  How-
ever, the professor is not there to be liked—the professor is there to 
educate the students.95 
Critics believe that this commitment to rationality over emo-
tion has the effect of telling the students that what they believe is un-
important and that it is pessimistic and depersonalizing.96  I find this 
critique wholly misguided.  Gerald Hess speaks of the sense of ex-
citement that law students have upon entering law school, how that 
sense of excitement disappears during students‘ law school careers, 
and states that law school should not have that effect on students.97  
One way of keeping students engaged is teaching them new skills and 
letting them get a sense of the mastery they are gaining. 
Students‘ mastery of the ability to move beyond themselves 
can be immensely liberating and exhilarating for them.  The impor-
tant thing is to make sure that students keep their eye on that particu-
lar ball.  They need to understand that the emphasis on analytical skill 
and rational thought is not inconsistent with passion for a cause; pro-
fessors need to create a context in which students understand that 
they are being taught these skills because these skills are integral to 
being an effective lawyer and that theses skills will help them to be 
effective lawyers so that they can pursue their passions with excel-
lence. 
At the same time, it is important that professors remind stu-
dents of how far they have come in mastering the skills needed to be 
a lawyer since they entered law school.  It is all too easy for students 
to get bogged down in the difficulty of a given assignment or series 
of assignments and lose perspective about how far they have come.98  
 
95 STOUT, supra note 91, at 232 (―But as a friend of mine—an experienced teacher—told 
me before I started teaching at university, ‗It doesn‘t matter if they like you; they only have 
to learn something from you.‘ ‖). 
96 Krieger, supra note 38, at 125 (―Law students get the message, early and often, that 
what they believe, or believed, at their core, is unimportant—in fact ‗irrelevant‘ and 
inappropriate in the context of legal discourse . . . .‖). 
97 See Hess, supra note 46, at 75. 
98 I was very lucky to have a professor who understood this point when I was in law 
school.  My Torts professor was a marvelous teacher named George Trubow.  He was a 
classic Socratic dialogue professor with all that it entails.  There was no doubt that he was 
intimidating.  However, the intimidation occurred not because he intended to intimidate us, 
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When students understand that the skills they are being asked to mas-
ter will further their goals, it creates a context that encourages them 
to work hard at these skills.  When they realize that they are indeed 
mastering these skills, they try even harder.  This is as true when the 
skill being mastered is rational analysis as other skills. 
IV. WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR CURRICULUM, THE SOCRATIC 
DIALOGUE IS BETTER SUITED TO MEET STUDENTS’ 
PEDAGOGICAL NEEDS THAN EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 
BECAUSE SOCRATIC DIALOGUE IS BETTER SUITED TO 
TEACHING FOUNDATIONAL SKILLS 
Advocates of experiential learning contend that it is a more 
effective method of teaching because it places learning the skills or 
information in a specific context and provides experience.  They ar-
gue that when students are trying to learn a skill or information, they 
will learn the skill or information better if it is to be used in a specific 
context.99  Thus, they argue, a student is more likely to learn analysis 
 
but rather because he was holding us to his very high standards.  Yet, for all that were 
intimidated, we loved having him as a teacher because he made it clear that he cared for his 
students and wanted us to learn and become fine lawyers.  One day we were covering 
defamation and just having a horrible time with one of the concepts.  After a few minutes, it 
was clear how badly the class was struggling and that we were becoming dispirited.  
Professor Trubow closed the book and looked at us.  He told us that he knew we were 
struggling.  He told us that the concept we were struggling with was difficult and not to get 
discouraged.  Instead, he told us to look back at how far we had come in the last ten weeks.  
He reminded us of a case we had struggled with early in the semester dealing with intent.  
Then he looked at us and asked us, ―Don‘t you wish you were dealing with an issue that 
simple now?‖  With that question, he showed us how far we had come.  The concept we 
were having trouble with is long since lost to posterity; the lesson he taught us has endured 
to this day and I make sure to remind my students of how far they have come each semester. 
99 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 22 (―Students who receive instruction that is 
contextualized by reference to problems or professional settings seem to believe that more is 
expected of them, and treat associated intellectual tasks with a greater seriousness of purpose 
and a higher level of engagement.‖). 
On one level, this is not a surprise.  Dealing with reallife cases is exciting.  
However, good teachers make the material they cover exciting to their students, regardless of 
how they teach, nor is there any reason that a teacher using Socratic dialogue cannot demand 
the same level of seriousness of purpose and engagement.  This is a function of good 
teaching. 
There is another aspect to this, however.  Much of law practice is not exciting, but 
rather consists of drudgery.  Students need to deal with drudgery.  On one level, preparing 
for a class using Socratic dialogue will not be as exciting as preparing to interview a client or 
represent that client in court.  Students may well have a difficult time mustering the self- 
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and synthesis skills when there is a specific problem that these skills 
are necessary to solve.  For example, students are more likely to learn 
about trespass to land if they are given a problem in which a client 
has asked for advice involving a neighbor who has cut down a tree on 
the client‘s property rather than if they are merely given an assign-
ment to learn about trespass to land. 
There is little dispute that providing a context for learning can 
help students, including law students, learn better.100  Every good 
teacher understands that implicitly.  However, recognizing the truth 
of this statement does not help resolve the issue of what kind of con-
text will best help the students learn.  Determining the proper context 
requires inquiry into what skills the professor is seeking to teach and 
what foundation students must already have in order for those skills 
to be successfully taught.  Many, if not most or all, first semester law 
students need to learn all the skills necessary to be a successful law-
yer.  These include textual exegesis, rule choice, fact development, 
contextual analysis, narrative development, and policy analysis,101 as 
 
discipline necessary to adequately prepare.  However, they need to learn to master that skill 
at least as much as other professional skills if they are to be successful. 
100 There is a reason that students learn abstract concepts better when those concepts are 
placed in context.  That is because students understand new concepts in the context of what 
they already are familiar with.  Most of what they are familiar with is concrete in nature 
rather than abstract.  Thus, giving the students a concrete example helps them because it 
allows them to relate the new, abstract idea to something they are already familiar with.  For 
a more detailed discussion, see WILLINGHAM, supra note 74, at 67-80. 
However, giving concrete examples so as to provide context for learning abstract 
concepts is not the same thing as experiential learning.  David Kolb describes experiential 
learning as follows: ―Immediate or concrete experiences are the basis for observations and 
reflections.  These reflections are assimilated and distilled into abstract concepts from which 
new implications for action can be drawn.  These implications can be actively tested and 
serve as guides in creating new experiences.‖  Alice Y. Kolb and David A. Kolb, Learning 
Styles and Learning Spaces: Enhancing Experiential Learning in Higher Education, 4 
ACAD. OF MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 193, 194 (2005) (emphasis in original). 
While many educators take the superiority of experiential learning as a given, there 
is far from unanimity on this issue.  For a list of critiques of experiential learning, see 
Experiential Learning Articles and Critiques of David Kolb’s Theory, 
http://reviewing.co.uk/research/experiential.learning.htm (last visited June 30, 2011).  A 
discussion of experiential learning would be far too complex for this paper.  For purposes of 
this discussion, I am willing to assume arguendo that experiential learning is valid.  I 
contend, however, that even if it is, Socratic learning will be more effective at this stage of a 
law student‘s career. 
101 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 215 (discussing Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth 
Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue About Socratic Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 249 (1997) and stating that all these skills are necessary to be a sophisticated law-
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well as the ability to listen effectively to clients, diagnose and analyze 
issues, negotiate, perhaps mediate, and perhaps most important, de-
vise the best solution for their clients, taking into account the eco-
nomic and emotional effects the legal problem being dealt with may 
have on the client. 
While all these skills are necessary to be an effective, sophis-
ticated lawyer, they cannot all be taught at once.  It is at this point 
that I part ways with the Carnegie Report.  The Carnegie Report re-
lies primarily on a study by Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus which 
argues that ―[f]ormal knowledge is not the source of expert practice.  
The reverse is true: expert practice is the source of formal knowledge 
about practice.‖102  The Report goes on to conclude that ―the progres-
sion from competence to expertise cannot be described as simply a 
step-by-step build-up of the lower functions.  In the world of practice, 
holism is real and prior to analysis.‖103 
I believe the Carnegie Report misses a crucial point.  I have 
no dispute with the idea that ultimately the process of becoming an 
expert requires the novice to be immersed in the milieu in which he 
or she hopes to become an expert, nor do I have any disagreement 
with the idea that immersion plays a part in a person‘s gaining insight 
into the profession and how to manipulate knowledge.  Rather, my 
disagreement lies in the stage at which such immersion should take 
place.  There are prerequisites that must be mastered before the no-
vice is ready to benefit from immersion.  After all, one does not train 
a mathematician by starting him or her with calculus.  The novice 
must learn algebra first.  Similarly, a pianist must practice and master 
G major scales before being able to play Beethoven‘s 4th Concerto in 
G Major, which contains many G major scale passages.104  One does 
not achieve mastery of the concerto by simply sitting down at the pi-
ano and trying to play the entire piece. 
A. There is a Difference Between Novice Learning and 
Expert Learning 
The reason that there are starting points is that when one 
 
yer). 
102 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 118. 
103 Id. 
104 Thank you to my colleague, Professor Bruce Morton, for this example. 
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learns, one thinks differently early in his or her training than later in 
one‘s training, or as Daniel Willingham states concisely, ―Cognition 
early in training is fundamentally different from cognition late in 
training.‖105  That means that activities that are appropriate for ex-
perts will not do much for students cognitively; in other words, it is 
unrealistic to expect novices to learn by doing the same activities as 
experts.106 
Novices become expert through practice.  Practice entails 
more than simply engaging in the activity one wishes to master.  It 
requires feedback from a knowledgeable teacher.  Just as important, it 
means ―investing time in activities that are not the target task itself 
but done for the sake of improving that task.‖107  However, mere 
practice by itself does not create expertise.  It is deliberate practice 
that results in expertise. 
Deliberate practice is different from practice.  ―[It] is a highly 
structured activity, the explicit goal of which is to improve perfor-
mance.  Specific tasks are invented to overcome weaknesses, and per-
formance is monitored to provide cues for ways to improve it fur-
ther.‖108  In other words, there are three critical aspects to mastering a 
skill—assessment of the students‘ skills and weaknesses, repetition 
and feedback. 
B. The Socratic Dialogue is Ideally Suited to Allow 
Students to Engage in Deliberate Practice and 
Master the Foundational Skills that Will Allow 
Expert Learning 
At some point in the curriculum, the students should be im-
mersed in the field of law.  Simulations, internships and externships, 
 
105 WILLINGHAM, supra note 74, at 98. 
106 Id. at 109. 
107 Id. at 151. 
108 K. Anders Ericsson, Ralf Th. Krampe, & Clemens Tesch-Romer, The Role of 
Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 363, 368 
(1993).  Ericsson et al. set forth the theory that there are several factors that are necessary to 
become an expert.  Id. at 363.  One of those factors is the willingness to exert sufficient 
effort to become expert.  Id. at 367.  More effort equals higher degree of expertise.  
However, simple effort is not enough.  Id. at 363.  Rather, mastery is achieved through 
recognition of one‘s weaknesses and specifically creating exercises that strengthen those 
weaknesses.  Id. at 368. 
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and live client clinics are all excellent means of immersion that will 
help students become better lawyers.  The proper question is where in 
the curriculum this immersion will be most effective. 
Some skills serve as foundations for others.  From my pers-
pective, textual exegesis is the first skill that needs to be mastered.  
Next comes the ability to analyze and synthesize cases, which skills 
include rule choice, fact development, contextual analysis, narrative 
development and policy analysis.  If students are to be able to compe-
tently determine which facets of the law are favorable to their client 
and which are detrimental to their clients‘ interests, they must be able 
to read and interpret the law the accurately.  A major part of this 
competence is the ability to read cases accurately. 
It is crucial to recognize that ―writing contains gaps—lots of 
gaps—from which the writer omits information that is necessary to 
understand the logical flow of ideas.  Writers assume that the reader 
has knowledge to fill the gaps.‖109  Judges write for lawyers, not law 
students.  They assume the intended readers, the lawyers, have the 
requisite knowledge to understand the opinions.  Law students, at 
least beginning law students, do not have that knowledge.  They must 
acquire that knowledge to be able to read the potentially relevant opi-
nions competently.  Socratic dialogue is an ideal way to impart that 
knowledge so that students can read the cases knowledgeably in order 
to analyze and synthesize them, with all that that implies. 
It is only after these skills are adequately developed that a suf-
ficient foundation has been laid for the student to be a sophisticated 
problem solver for the client.  In other words, it is only after the set of 
specific skills has been developed that giving the students the oppor-
tunity to apply those skills in an experiential setting will be most ef-
fective.  In order for students to become effective lawyers, they must 
practice activities that do not constitute lawyering itself, but will faci-
litate their ability as lawyers when that activity is applied.  Looked at 
from this perspective, the question becomes which method is most 
effective at teaching those foundation skills—Socratic dialogue or 
experiential learning.110 
 
109 WILLINGHAM, supra note 74, at 23. 
110 If one concludes, as I do, that Socratic dialogue is more effective, then a second 
question arises—how far into the curriculum can Socratic dialogue continue to be effective?  
See infra text accompanying notes 131-36. 
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What critics favoring experiential learning fail to credit is that 
Socratic dialogue does create a context that enhances learning.  Each 
case studied has a fact pattern against which the discussion of law 
takes place.  Traditional law school learning does not consist of pro-
fessors assigning the Restatements of Contracts or Torts and then 
asking students to memorize the rules contained therein and master 
what they mean.  To the contrary, the students are given a fact pattern 
in each case they study and then they are shown what the law is (and 
often how it developed) and how it applies to the facts of the case.111  
In other words, students can proceed one step at a time, at a pace that 
does not overwhelm them.  While not every case creates a scenario in 
which every skill a lawyer needs to possess may be addressed, the to-
tality of cases in each course will provide numerous opportunities for 
a professor concerned about these skills to address them with the 
class. 
Briefing the cases is the most effective way of teaching these 
skills.  It not only allows the students to break the skills being mas-
tered into small enough building blocks to be mastered, it also allows 
for deliberate practice.  Within the context of learning foundational 
skills, that means that students can attempt a brief, see what they did 
wrong, and try to correct for this in the next set of briefs.  By using 
Socratic dialogue to focus on analysis and synthesis, which even crit-
ics such as the Carnegie Report and Best Practices admits are effec-
tive for this purpose, students have an opportunity to repeat this exer-
cise.  Further, with feedback from the professor, the students can 
discover the weaknesses in their briefing skills and focus on those in 
the next set of briefs.112  It is important to focus on these particular 
 
111 I recognize that the facts that the court sets forth in the opinion are a distilled version 
of what lawyers will face in practice and that if a professor goes no further than those facts 
students will not learn about the indeterminacy of facts in real life.  There are two factors to 
consider in dealing with this criticism.  First, it is incumbent on faculty to point out to 
students how the facts are determined in a case, whether it is a trial court opinion or an 
appellate opinion.  This gives the professor an opportunity to discuss the indeterminacy of 
facts and introduce students to the concept.  Second, there is a foundation issue.  Mastering 
the ability to apply the law to the facts of a case is separate from the issues involved in 
discovering facts.  Without the ability to apply the law to the facts, the students will not 
know what facts they need to look for. 
112 I do not want to overstate my argument.  Ericsson et al. state that it takes 10,000 hours 
of practice over ten years to reach true expertise and that individualized feedback is 
necessary.  Ericsson et al., supra note 108, at 368.  No matter how intense law school may 
be, students are not going to engage in 10,000 hours of deliberate practice, and law school is 
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skills, rather than diluting them, so that they can be improved upon 
through deliberate practice. 
Then, as students gain sufficient mastery of a skill, the next 
set of skills can be introduced.  The students‘ mastery of the skill 
need not be complete before the next set of skills is introduced.  In 
fact, ideally the next set of skills can be used to reinforce the previous 
set of skills.  For example, in dealing with issues involved in the in-
determinacy of facts, professors should explore how each possible set 
of facts will impact the case, requiring the students to set forth their 
analyses precisely. 
There is another factor—one that proponents of contextual or 
experiential learning have missed—that substantially favors the ef-
fectiveness of Socratic dialogue over experiential learning in teaching 
students the foundation skills I have listed above.  That factor is the 
crucial need for students to master metacognition as an integral part 
of being a good lawyer.  Metacognition requires introspection.  Stu-
dents must explore the way they think.113  Socratic dialogue, if done 
skillfully, has at its core the students‘ thought processes and forces 
them to figure out why they came to the conclusions they reached.  It 
is ideally suited to foster mastery of metacognition. 
Without mastery of the foundational skills, students cannot 
make effective decisions on behalf of their clients.  It is only after 
students have mastered the basic skills that they can meaningfully 
start to make decisions on behalf of their clients.114  Given the impor-
 
not going to extend for ten years.  Nonetheless, simple awareness of these principles means 
that they can be incorporated into teaching and mentoring to create a more effective teaching 
style. 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72. 
114 The reason this is so is based on how learning takes place and how novices become 
experts.  Students learn by combining information from the environment, such as what they 
are being taught or what they are experiencing, with information from long-term memory.  
This takes place in that portion of the mind known as working memory.  See WILLINGHAM, 
supra note 74, at 10-14.  However, working memory serves as a bottleneck in the process.  
People can only maintain so much information in their working memory at one time.  
Experts have better analytical skills than novices because they have a greater degree of 
knowledge in their long-term memories, but even more importantly, they have knowledge of 
structures and processes in their long-term knowledge.  Because this knowledge resides in 
long-term memory, it does not create a bottleneck in working memory.  Experts can call on 
these processes to interpret data they receive from the environment.  See WILLINGHAM, supra 
note 74, at 97-111. 
       Within the law school context, I am suggesting that students will be able to better 
concentrate on determining what decisions they make that will best serve their clients if they 
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tance of metacognition in mastering the foundational skills, it is cru-
cial that pedagogical techniques be used that foster the introspection 
necessary for mastery of metacognition.115  For the reasons I have just 
stated, I contend that Socratic dialogue is best suited to this task. 
In conclusion, the criticism that Socratic dialogue is not as ef-
fective a teaching method as experiential learning is erroneous.  It 
fails to recognize adequately that some skills are foundations for oth-
er skills, and that certain teaching techniques may work better for 
foundational skills than others.  I do not want to overstate my argu-
ment with regard to this last statement.  Every professor has different 
strengths and weaknesses for teaching different materials.  It may 
well be that for any given professor experiential learning works best, 
while for other professors Socratic dialogue is best suited to their 
teaching strengths.  The critical point is that there is nothing intrinsic 
to Socratic dialogue that makes it inferior to experiential learning 
with respect to teaching foundational skills.  It is the individual pro-
fessor‘s style and abilities that will determine the efficacy of any par-
ticular teaching technique rather than the intrinsic superiority of the 
technique. 
 
V. A LAW SCHOOL’S CULTURE FOSTERS PROFESSIONALISM, 
NOT ITS CHOICE BETWEEN THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUE OR 
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING AS ITS CURRICULUM 
All of the above is not to say that a proper environment—
emphasizing that a lawyer is a problem solver who must be ethical 
and committed to justice—should not be created from the start.  
However, nothing in the use of Socratic dialogue prevents the profes-
sor, or the curriculum, from creating such an environment.  Law 
 
have achieved some level of mastery of the foundational skills of textual exegesis and the 
ability to analyze and synthesize cases, which skills include rule choice, fact development, 
contextual analysis, narrative development, and policy analysis.  If they have achieved this 
level of mastery, they can then focus on how to learn how to make decisions on behalf of 
their clients.  If, in contrast, they do not have this level of mastery, then they will be much 
less efficient and effective in making these decisions because they will have to continually 
derive this information in working memory. 
115 It may seem odd for me, in a paper where I talk about narcissistic students, to say that 
the students need to be introspective in their first year and perhaps second year but self-
absorption is not synonymous with introspection. 
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schools should emphasize the primacy of the client, as well as other 
professional obligations, early in the students‘ academic careers, pre-
ferably starting at orientation.  However, there are ways to do that 
without distracting from a pedagogical technique so well suited to 
fostering metacognition.  In fact, I would go further than this state-
ment.  The key to fostering the professionalism that should indisputa-
bly be the goal of legal education is to foster a culture that pervades 
the entire law school environment.  Most important, fostering a cul-
ture of professionalism is not a function of the curriculum; it is a 
function of the faculty inside and outside of the classroom.  If the fa-
culty does not have such a commitment then no curricular structure 
will compensate for the lack of such a commitment; if the faculty at a 
law school is committed to establishing these precepts, then it is like-
ly that students will learn these lessons regardless of the curricular 
structure. 
There are several aspects to professionalism, but I would like 
to focus on one in particular, which is a focus of the Carnegie Re-
port—whether law schools place sufficient emphasis on achieving 
justice.116  The Carnegie Report states that it is concerned not only 
that law schools do not place sufficient emphasis on creating a cul-
ture of justice, but also that Socratic dialogue contributes to the defi-
ciency.117 
In addressing this issue, I want to make two things clear.  
First, I concur wholeheartedly that a key portion of being a profes-
sional lawyer is a commitment to justice and the public good.  
Second, I also agree that law schools have cultures and that a particu-
lar school‘s culture can have a major influence on how its students 
view the profession.  The scholarship is rife with stories of how a law 
school‘s culture can change students‘ perspectives of the law and 
what kind of careers they may seek.  The usual story is about how 
students come in idealistically and that the law school‘s culture 
pushed them in the direction of corporate law. 
 
116 The Carnegie Report cites with approval the 1996 report of the Professionalism 
Committee of the American Bar Association‘s Section of Legal Education and Admission to 
the Bar, which characterizes professional lawyers as being dedicated to ―justice and the 
public good.‖  SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 126. 
117 In discussing law school pedagogy, the Report states that Socratic dialogue sends the 
―tacit message . . . that for legal professionals, matters of justice are secondary to formal 
correctness.‖  SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 58. 
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Richard Kahlenberg, in Broken Contract, summarizes the 
process as follows.118  He starts by asking how it was that so many 
students could start law school highly idealistic and end up working 
for corporate law firms.  He states that a transformation takes place 
during law school that results in students who were initially interested 
in effectuating social change deciding to work for corporate law 
firms.119  He ultimately concludes that the belief that it was important 
for the fortunate to give back to society was one that ―most of my 
colleagues at H[arvard] L[aw] S[school] had ceased to find credible‖ 
and that such cynicism had been taught, at least in part, by the facul-
ty.120  Kahlenberg writes that he and the other members of his class 
did not believe the ―graduation rhetoric‖ about the need to solve the 
world‘s problems ―because we were taught, directly and indirectly, 
not to believe it.‖121 
The culture at Harvard Law School, a function of the faculty‘s 
attitudes both inside and outside the classroom, led students not to be-
lieve in justice as part of the law‘s calling.  Kahlenberg‘s lament is 
hardly alone,122 nor can there seriously be any doubt that the culture 
 
118 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT (1999).  Kahlenburg would not agree 
with the central thesis of my argument, that Socratic dialogue is an essential part of the law 
school curriculum.  He is critical of the Socratic dialogue throughout his entire discussion of 
his law school career.  Nonetheless, that does not undermine my reliance on the central 
thesis of his book, that the culture of the law school has a profound influence on its 
studentsand that the faculty plays the central role in communicating that culture to the 
students. 
119 Id. at 5. 
120 Id. at 231. 
121 KAHLENBURG, supra note 118, at 234. 
122 See, e.g., Brett Deforest Maxfield, Ethics, Politics and Securities Law: How Unethical 
People are Using Politics to Undermine the Integrity of Our Courts and Financial Markets, 
35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 243, 244 (2009) (―Law school seemed to kill the idealism of most of 
my fellow students who had come to law school to change the world for the better and now 
just wanted to make money.‖); Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: 
How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 
1155, 1202 (2008) (asserting that ―[t]he most highly-ranked law schools are research institu-
tions that adhere to a curriculum that has historically been designed to prepare students for 
work in a large law firm setting‖); Jenée Desmond-Harris, “Public Interest Drift” Revisited: 
Tracing the Sources of Social Change Commitment Among Black Harvard Law Students, 4 
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 335, 387-88 (2007) (noting that ―assimilation to norms of 
H[arvard] L[aw] S[chool]‖ is accompanied by the ―tendency to lose interest in social change 
careers‖); Robert Granfield, Constructing Professional Boundaries in Law School: Reactions 
of Students and Implications for Teachers, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S STUD. 53, 70 
(1994) (―For most students, the completion of first year studies signal[ed] a removal of any 
involvement in the law as a search for justice [and] . . . cynicism was pervasive among stu-
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of a law school can affect its students‘ beliefs. 
What can be doubted, however, is whether it is the school‘s 
curriculum or its faculty that set the culture.  I will suggest that it is 
the school‘s faculty that sets the culture.  It does not matter how the 
curriculum is structured if the faculty continue to tell the students that 
justice is unimportant.  The same lesson can be learned in a Socratic 
dialogue setting as in an experiential learning setting. 
A school might attempt to demonstrate its commitment to jus-
tice in many ways.  One method might be to introduce a mandatory 
course dedicated to exploring issues of justice in the legal profession.  
This, of course, creates several different questions that must be ans-
wered.  When is the course to be offered?  If it is in the first year, will 
there be any follow-up?  If it is offered in the second or third year, 
will that be too late to offset whatever corrosive effects the first year 
of law school may have had on the students‘ sense of justice?  Should 
there be a mandatory Justice course and a mandatory Justice compo-
nent in each required course, as well as large enrollment electives? 
The truth is that none of these answers will matter to the stu-
dents if the faculty does not make a concerted effort to make justice 
an integral theme throughout the entire law school experience.  If a 
mandatory Justice course is offered, unless the faculty reinforces this 
theme throughout the law school experience there is a danger that the 
students will come to view justice as a compartmentalized component 
of the curriculum—just another course in which to strive for an A— 
and fail to realize its importance to professionalism.  So assume that 
in order to resolve that concern, a Justice component is mandated in 
every required course, as well as selected non-required ―core‖ 
courses.  If the faculty do not take this mandate seriously, the 
mandate will be meaningless.  If the faculty member is teaching this 
material solely because of a mandate, he or she is unlikely to spend 
much time on it.  Even worse, the faculty member may very well, 
through body language or attitude towards teaching the material, send 
the message that this material is not very important, thus undercutting 
the very purpose of the mandated material. 
In all these scenarios, it is not the curriculum that will deter-
mine the success or failure of impressing the student with the impor-
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the faculty‘s attitude towards sending this message.  Within virtually 
every course there is an opportunity to include a justice component if 
the professor feels that it is important.  Torts, Contracts, Criminal 
Law, Civil Procedure, and Constitutional Law, just to name a few, all 
require discussion of policy questions in which a discussion of what 
the appropriate policy should be can include issues of justice. 
Not only is that discussion not intrinsically inhibited by So-
cratic dialogue, Socratic dialogue provides a unique opportunity to 
discuss such issues.  This is because within Socratic dialogue the stu-
dents are being encouraged to explore issues from all sides rationally.  
Placing a discussion of justice in this context precludes a student 
from cutting short the dialogue by simply stating that the student be-
lieves that a particular position is the just one.  Rather, placing the 
discussion in the context of a Socratic dialogue requires the students 
to explore why they believe the way they do.  In other words, there is 
nothing in Socratic dialogue that precludes a discussion of justice or 
other aspects of professionalism.  Rather, the extent to which these 
aspects of professionalism will be emphasized is dependent on the at-
titudes of the faculty teaching them and the quality of the teaching. 
One can see the accuracy of this observation by looking at the 
implementation of ethics courses in law schools and their failure to 
achieve the goal of substantially raising the level of ethics in the legal 
profession.  The extensive involvement of lawyers in the Watergate 
scandal in the early 1970s was the impetus for the American Bar As-
sociation regulation that Professional Responsibility be taught in law 
schools,123 which led, for the first time, to all law schools offering a 
course in Professional Responsibility by the late 1970s.124  That this 
failed to adequately elevate the ethics of the legal profession can 
hardly be disputed.  Indeed, one of the major concerns of the Carne-
gie Report is fostering a higher degree of legal ethics.125  The Carne-
gie Report recognizes that one of the problems with creating a dis-
crete Professional Responsibility course was that it cabined the issue 
of legal ethics away from the rest of the curriculum, with the result 
that ethical issues ended up being segregated from the rest of the cur-
 
123 The current rule so requiring is Standard 302(a)(5). 
124 Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics: The Coming of Age of Global and Comparative 
Perspectives, 4 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 463, 474 (2005); Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, 
Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 61, 68 (2003). 
125 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 148-51. 
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riculum.  In other words, the failure of the culture of the law schools 
to emphasize ethics in the entirety of the curriculum contributed to 
ineffectiveness in trying to inculcate a culture of ethicality.126 
Just as important, there is nothing in the type of curriculum, 
practical or otherwise, that guarantees that the professor will be ethi-
cal.  The creation of a culture of ethics depends on the entire faculty 
creating such a culture, not on the types of courses the faculty teach-
es.  Consider, for example, the following plaint made by a law stu-
dent.  She was speaking of her Contracts professor.  ― ‗You have to 
be sneaky,‘ said the Professor today.  Translation: You have to lie.‖  
It would make no difference whether the professor who communi-
cated such a lesson were teaching in a classic Socratic dialogue or in 
a clinical setting.  In either setting, it would be the lesson the profes-
sor was teaching that had the greatest effect, not the type of course 
that was being taught. 
Finally, the misadventures of graduate business schools dem-
onstrate that it is not Socratic dialogue that creates problems in ethics.  
Some of the finest graduate business schools utilize the case study 
method as the primary curriculum.  Harvard Business School de-
scribes the case method as follows: 
When students are presented with a case, they place 
themselves in the role of the decision maker as they 
read through the situation and identify the problem 
they are faced with.  The next step is to perform the 
necessary analysis—examining the causes and consi-
dering alternative courses of actions to come to a set 
of recommendations.127 
 
126 To be sure, there were undoubtedly other factors at work in this failure as well.  As the 
Carnegie Report points out, other factors in law school culture, such as the competitiveness 
created by a grade curve may contribute to a failure of ethics.  Id. at 31.  Certainly, societal 
norms play a role as well.  With numerous reports of widespread cheating in academia prior 
to law school, it cannot be a surprise that law students may already be ethically challenged 
by the time they get to law school.  See DAVID CALLAHAN, THE CHEATING CULTURE 196-219 
(2004).  It may well be that by the time that students get to law shool, their characters are  
sufficiently formed that emphasis on ethics cannot be terribly effective.  Unless the entire 
faculty places an emphasis on ethics, merely creating a course on Professional Responsibility 
will not inculcate an ethical character in the student body by itself. 
127 How the HBS Case Method Works, HBS, http://www.hbs.edu/mba/ 
academics/howthecasemethodworks.html (last visited June 30, 2011).  A similar description 
can be found at other business schools.  See, e.g., Case Method: Academics: MBA: Darden 
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This is similar to the simulations that the Carnegie Report 
suggests will improve law school education.128  There is no evidence 
that this difference in curriculum has led to more ethical behavior in 
business people with MBAs than in lawyers.  One need only look at 
the business scandals in the last ten years, such as Enron or the nu-
merous scandals on Wall Street to refute the idea that a difference in 
the curriculum will make the difference in ethical behavior.  Indeed, 
business schools are sufficiently concerned about their students‘ eth-
ics that they are altering their curricula to include more emphasis on 
ethics.129  In other words, the mere use of the case study, or in law 
school, the case conference model, is no guarantee of improved ethi-
cal behavior among graduates.  Rather, it is the message sent by fa-
culty and administration—the culture of the law school—that has the 
potential for the greatest effect on law students. 
VI. THE ROLE OF THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUE BEYOND THE FIRST 
YEAR CURRICULUM 
Given that Socratic dialogue is an effective technique for 
teaching foundational skills, the other question that arises is for how 
much of the curriculum is the use of Socratic dialogue appropriate.  
Certainly its use in the first year, in which students are striving to 
master foundational skills, is appropriate.  The question is more one 
of to what extent its use is appropriate in the second and third years.  
LSSSE130 data indicate growing student dissatisfaction with law 
schools as they progress through the curriculum.  Much of that dissa-
tisfaction arises from the continued use of Socratic dialogue through-
out their entire law school careers.  Students report that by their third 
year they have mastered the skills necessary for case analysis and 
 
School of Business, DARDEN.VIRGINIA, http://www.darden.virginia.edu/html/standard.aspx 
?menu_id=72&styleid=2&id=812 (last visited June 30, 2011). 
128 The Carnegie Report suggests the increased use of lawyering courses in the first year 
curriculum.  SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 194-200.  Note, however, that the use of the 
case study method has been criticized.  See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN 
AND METHODS 14-19 (4th ed. 2009). 
129 David A. Kaplan, MBAs Get Schooled in Ethics, FORTUNESMALLBUSINESS (Oct. 19, 
2009, 9:01 AM), http://www.fortunesmallbusiness.com/2009/10/16/news/economy/ 
mbas_ethics_classes.fortune/index.htm. 
130 The Law School Survey of Student Engagement.  These surveys can be found at 
http://lssse.iub.edu. 
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synthesis and are bored.131 
This indicates two potential, yet different problems.  Does the 
boredom result from true mastery of the foundational skills so that 
continued use of Socratic dialogue is truly counterproductive?  Or 
does it result from the ineffective use of Socratic dialogue, either be-
cause the teacher cannot use it effectively or because it is being used 
for purposes it is not well-designed to teach?  The answer is probably 
a combination of both.  Certainly, one can reasonably expect that law 
students will gain a reasonable mastery of these skills at some point 
after the first year.  At that point, continued use of Socratic dialogue 
when the primary purpose of the professor is dissemination of infor-
mation is counterproductive.  There are more efficient ways to dis-
seminate information than Socratic dialogue.  Similarly, if the pur-
pose of the course is to teach practical skills, there are better 
techniques than Socratic dialogue.  The conclusion thus becomes in-
escapable that as students advance through the law school curricu-
lum, other teaching techniques should be utilized. 
That conclusion, however, leaves open a question: how quick-
ly should the Socratic dialogue be phased out?  Reasonable people 
may differ on this point; however, I believe there is a need for Socrat-
ic dialogue to have a significant, although not necessarily dominant, 
position in the second year curriculum.  I believe it even has a place 
in the third year curriculum, although it should probably be much di-
minished.  How much presence it should have in the second and third 
year curricula is not susceptible to a definitive answer.  The answer 
will, of necessity, differ from school to school, depending on the mis-
sion of each school as well as the quality of its students.  However, in 
all schools, even in the schools with the best students, it is unlikely 
that students will have completely mastered the foundational skills by 
the end of the first year.  The majority of students may well have 
mastered the basic skills of textual exegesis and the ability to analyze 
and synthesize cases.  However, the degree of mastery at the end of 
the first year hardly represents the pinnacle of achievement in this 
area.  There is much subtlety and nuance left to master. 
This need for greater mastery was demonstrated in the re-
marks of Professor Suzanna Sherry at the 2009 Association of Amer-
ican Law Schools Annual Meeting.  Speaking on a panel entitled, ―Is 
 
131 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 75-77. 
54
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss4/6
  
2012] A HERETICAL VIEW OF TEACHING 1293 
 
American Constitutional Law in Crisis?,‖ Professor Sherry discussed 
the effect of placing Constitutional Law in the first year curriculum 
rather than the second year.132  She stated that first year students are 
―intellectually immature in the discipline of law‖ and that ―they are 
likely to see in black and white instead of shades of gray.‖133  She 
stated that it takes them a while to become sufficiently sophisticated 
to see the shades of gray and that they were insufficiently sophisti-
cated to achieve that level in their first year of law school.134  She ar-
gued that this intellectual immaturity precludes them from an appro-
priate understanding of Constitutional Law and that they need to 
master legal doctrine in other courses before they can properly pro-
ceed to the proper understanding of Constitutional Law.135  She con-
cluded her remarks by recommending that Constitutional Law be tak-
en out of the first year curriculum.
136
 
In other words, there is only a certain degree of mastery that 
can be achieved by students in their first year of law school.  Most 
students enter as novices to the discourse, and there is a limit to how 
much progress can be made during the first year.  After they have 
mastered the basics of the foundational skills, there is still room for 
further development and refinement of these skills.  Socratic dialogue 
can play a major role in this refinement for all the reasons that it is 
effective in teaching these skills to the students when they are novic-
es.  Thus, it plays an appropriate role in the curriculum beyond the 
first year for faculty who choose to use it for those purposes.  While 
its role should be diminished and there should be increasing emphasis 
on other teaching techniques of the sort contemplated by the Carne-
gie Report and Best Practices in the upper level curriculum, there is 
still room in the second and third years for courses utilizing Socratic 
dialogue that will continue to refine students‘ skills.137 
 
132 Remarks of Professor Suzanna Sherry, ―Is American Constitutional Law in Crisis?,‖ 





137 As an example, courses in Computer Law readily serve such a function.  The issues 
that arise with the context of the rise of the digital age and the internet create cutting edge 
issues.  These issues take established policy and apply it to circumstances not originally 
envisioned.  This requires students to be able to read precedents and statutes in a 
sophisticated manner beyond what they are likely to master in the first year.  As a result, 
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VII. THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO BE DONE BY THE CARNEGIE 
REPORT AND BEST PRACTICES: THEIR ERRONEOUS FOCUS 
ON THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUE MISLEADS LAW SCHOOLS 
AWAY FROM THEIR TRUE PROBLEM—THE NEED TO PLACE 
PRIMACY ON ATTRACTING GOOD TEACHERS 
There is no doubt that the critique of law school instruction by 
the Carnegie Report and Best Practices is thoughtful and well inten-
tioned.  Further, to the extent that such thoughtful critiques are a spur 
to law schools not to let inertia guide their curricula and to look for 
means by which to improve their curricula, they should be applauded.  
Nonetheless, the desirability of thoughtful critiques does not mean 
their conclusions should be unthinkingly adopted.  Rather, they 
should also be painstakingly vetted to determine their validity. 
I believe that the Carnegie Report and Best Practices miss the 
mark with their recommendations for two major reasons.  First, as 
explained above, many of the failures in instruction that they are con-
cerned about are the failure not of the teaching techniques used in the 
curriculum—primarily Socratic dialogue—but rather the failures in 
the faculty utilizing this technique.  Second, law schools do not select 
for good teachers; law schools essentially select for excellent students 
who are capable of becoming excellent scholars.  I will address each 
of these points seriatim. 
Now it is possible that, as Best Practices alleges, the majority 
of law school faculty are not skilled in using Socratic dialogue.  
However, there is no reason to believe that faculty who are ineffec-
tive at using Socratic dialogue would be any more capable under 
some other method of teaching.  In fact, there is reason to think they 
might very well be worse.  Law schools do not dedicate a great deal 
of resources to training professors how to be effective teachers.  At 
least the Socratic dialogue has been modeled for law faculty.  If they 
cannot teach well using an approach that has been modeled, there is 
no reason to think they are likely to be effective teachers using some 
 
Computer Law and related courses are wonderful instruments for measuring students‘ ability 
to analyze and synthesize cases as they relate to law and social policy and increase students‘ 
mastery.  Socratic dialogue is especially well-suited to this task, even in the third year.  Nor 
is Computer Law unique in this regard. 
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other method for which there has been no training.138  In other words, 
the attempt at curricular reform is a systemic solution for an individ-
ual problem.  In such instances, systemic solutions are inefficient at 
best and ineffective at worst. 
Although earlier I criticized Best Practices for starting from 
the presumption that the majority of faculty are poor teachers, it is 
necessary to realize that this might indeed be so.  Law schools do not 
select for good teachers.  Law schools essentially select for excellent 
students who are capable of becoming excellent scholars.  Neither the 
ability to be an excellent student nor the ability to be an excellent 
scholar implies the ability to be a good teacher.  Further, there is no 
reason to think that faculty who are poor instructors using their pre-
ferred choice of teaching techniques will be any more effective using 
a different technique urged upon them by administrators or other fa-
culty in a rush to adopt the latest, greatest trend. 
It is the quality of the teacher that will determine how much 
students learn, not the techniques that they use.  That is not to say that 
technique is unimportant; however, a poor teacher will not effectively 
educate students regardless of the technique he or she uses.  Until law 
schools truly make selecting for excellent teachers the linchpin of 
their hiring philosophies instead of merely paying it lip service, 
changes in curriculum will merely result in improvement at the 
edges, if at all, rather than making substantial improvements. 
The law school hiring process is dominated by a search for 
credentials.  The vast majority of law professors hired matriculated at 
elite law schools.139  Of those who matriculated at elite law schools, 
the most sought after are those who receive prestigious clerkships or 
have worked for prestigious firms.  Such applicants are the students 
who did well in their first year of law school and made law review.  
None of these credentials are an accurate proxy for the successful 
ability to teach, nor should they be expected to be.  The ability to 
 
138 It is possible that some faculty might improve if they were to change their teaching 
techniques.  However, there is no reason to think that this would be universally true or that it 
would even be substantially true. 
139 Professor Randolph Jonakait cites a study by Brian Leiter showing that from 1996-
2001, three quarters of law faculty starting tenure track jobs came from 19 schools, with a 
third of them coming from three schools, Harvard, Yale, and Stanford.  Randolph N. 
Jonakait, The Two Hemispheres of Legal Education and The Rise and Fall of Local Law 
Schools, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 863, 901-902 (2006-2007). 
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score highly on a final exam or a paper indicates the ability to under-
stand material at a certain level and communicate that mastery to a 
sophisticated reader.  Similarly, law clerks and practitioners are writ-
ing for a more sophisticated audience than first year law students.  
Their ability to write for those audiences does not necessarily trans-
late to an ability to communicate effectively with novices to the dis-
course. 
At the same time, once faculty are hired, law schools put a 
strong emphasis on scholarship.  Good teaching is not enough to 
qualify a professor for tenure.  There must be a strong record of scho-
larship.  The emphasis on scholarship is so overwhelming that appli-
cants for faculty positions make a point of asking what accommoda-
tions will be made to facilitate their scholarship.  I have served on the 
faculty appointments committee for my school for several years and 
attended the AALS recruiting conference held each November.  
Every faculty candidate we have interviewed in recent years has 
asked what accommodations will be made to facilitate their scholar-
ship.  The anticipated accommodation is that they will receive a light 
teaching load so that they can engage in the scholarship necessary to 
achieve tenure.  I will suggest that when law schools tell young facul-
ty that they will lessen their teaching load so that the young faculty 
can write, law schools make it clear that teaching is of secondary im-
portance. 
That is not to say that scholarship is unimportant.  The kind of 
mind that engages in inquiry and a desire to solve problems is likely 
to show the same kind of inquisitiveness necessary to good teaching.  
Additionally, law faculty serve many different functions.  They serve 
as valuable consultants both to private parties and government.  Their 
research and scholarship can make valuable contributions to the legal 
profession.  Also, a law school faculty‘s scholarship can contribute to 
the prestige and influence of the law school itself.  Therefore, one can 
readily understand the intrinsic and extrinsic value of scholarship to 
law faculty and law schools. 
Nonetheless, the ability to produce quality scholarship is not 
an accurate proxy for the ability to teach effectively.  Similar to the 
skills necessary to excel in law school, clerkships, and practice, effec-
tiveness at scholarship involves the ability to communicate effective-
ly with an audience that is sophisticated and experienced in the issues 
being addressed.  This does not automatically translate to the ability 
58
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss4/6
  
2012] A HERETICAL VIEW OF TEACHING 1297 
 
to communicate effectively with tyros. 
The ability to effectively teach law students is, at its core, the 
ability to communicate with newcomers to the discipline.  This in-
volves two different facets.  First, one must teach novices the ability 
to think within certain disciplines.140  Second, one must effectively 
transmit information.  Moreover, both of these facets must often be 
taught simultaneously. 
The ability to do this effectively initially requires the ability to 
take sophisticated, complex materials and break them down into 
component parts that students can master a part at a time.  Then the 
teacher must be able to recombine these basic building blocks.  The 
recombination of basic building blocks into a more complex structure 
serves two purposes.  First, it teaches the newcomer how the various 
components fit together.  Second, by recombining the components in-
to a more complex scheme, the teacher helps the students understand 
the nuances involved in the doctrine or skill being learned.  Ideally, 
the teacher not only demonstrates how the components fit together, 
but also provides guidance to students as to how they might restruc-
ture the components so that students can fashion new insights as a re-
sult of understanding the individual components and then discovering 
how they fit together.141  The ability to do this requires the teacher to 
not only understand the subject matter deeply, something most facul-
ty have mastered, but more importantly, to have a deep understanding 
of his or her own metacognition.  The teacher needs to be able to un-
derstand just how it is that he or she mastered the subject matter so 
 
140 I am not speaking solely of the ability to ―think like a lawyer‖ in the traditional sense.  
I am referring to the practice skills necessary to be an effective lawyer.  See supra text 
accompanying footnote 33. 
141 For example, towards the end of my Constitutional Law course, the class addresses the 
issue of Congressional power to provide remedies pursuant to Section 5 of the 14th 
Amendment.  Specifically, we compare and contrast three cases, Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources 
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).  Each of these 
cases explores the constitutionality of a Congressional statute enacted under Section 5 and 
arguably the results of these cases are, at best, inconsistent.  By the time students study these 
cases, they can integrate analysis of Congressional powers, federalism, separation of powers, 
judicial deference, and different levels of equal protection into their discussions.  It is not 
just a matter of these cases being an excellent opportunity to review a year‘s worth of work.  
What is crucial is that the students can discuss these cases in much greater depth and with 
greater insights for having mastered the earlier doctrines in depth and then understanding 
how they fit together in this specific context. 
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deeply.  Then the teacher must be able to lead the students on a simi-
lar journey, not just within the context of showing the students the 
route that the teacher traveled but, much more importantly, teaching 
the students how to discover their own routes. 
Depth of mastery of a subject area does not necessarily corre-
late with the ability to teach the subject matter.  Within the sports 
world, it is understood that very often the best athletes do not make 
good coaches or managers.  There may be a variety of reasons for 
this, but two stand out as reasonable hypotheses.  First, for some ath-
letes the particular skill that they display comes so naturally that the 
athlete does not have to question what it is that allows them master 
the skill.142  Second, because they have achieved such high levels of 
mastery, they may be impatient with those who do not display those 
levels of mastery.  In other words, mastering a skill does not neces-
sarily impart the ability to teach others how to master that skill. 
It is true that in the classroom we are talking about the ability 
to learn rather than mastering a physical skill.  Yet there can be no 
doubt that for some people the ability to master learning the law 
comes more easily than to others.  For a student for whom mastery 
comes quickly, there may not be the need for the kind of introspec-
tion and emphasis on metacognition that the student having more 
trouble might need.  Further, one to whom such mastery came ―natu-
rally‖ might be impatient with those for whom it does not come as 
quickly.  For students to whom this description applies there is no 
reason to think that they would be good teachers.  They are likely to 
be unsympathetic to students having trouble understanding new ma-
terial.  Worse, they may well be unable to effectively communicate to 
the students how to master the material, leaving it to the students to 
somehow master the material.  In fact, I will suggest that much of the 
scholarship criticizing law school education is really criticism of fa-
culty who cannot communicate to the students how to master the ma-
terial or are impatient and do not want to take the time to communi-
cate to the students how to master the material. 
This is not to say that brilliant law practitioners or theoreti-
cians cannot be effective, even superlative, teachers.  Undoubtedly 
everyone can think of more than one example of a brilliant practi-
 
142 That is not to say that star athletes do not work hard to master those skills.  The 
greatest athletes are renowned for their work ethic. 
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tioner or theoretician who is also a superb teacher.  But it does make 
clear that the two sets are not identical or even that there is or should 
be significant overlap.  Since there is no reason to think that bril-
liance as a student or lawyer is a proxy for effectiveness as a teacher, 
law schools‘ failure to place emphasis on teaching skills as the prima-
ry (or at least an equally important) requirement in hiring means that 
there are indeed likely to be many faculty who are not effective 
teachers.  Teachers lacking the ability to effectively communicate the 
skills that are necessary for students to master the material will be in-
effective regardless of technique.  There is no reason to think that 
they will be more effective if only they change their teaching tech-
nique.143  Nor is there reason to think that schools will change their 
emphasis to good teaching, no matter how much lip service they may 
pay to this suggestion.  The Carnegie Report itself makes this clear.  
The Report states that the uniformity of background for the vast ma-
jority of law faculty results in replication of the desire for prestige 
within the academy and that this leads to emphasis on scholarship, ra-
ther than teaching.144 
 
143 One need not merely posit this on a theoretical basis.  Evidence of this can be found in 
the fact that in recent years, there has been movement away from Socratic dialogue and 
increased emphasis on practical skills, including the huge growth of clinical programs.  Yet, 
as there has been increased emphasis on practical skills, student mastery of lawyering skills 
apparently has not increased to a satisfactory level.  In fact, if anything, criticism of law 
school pedagogy has increased.  Note the recent publication of the Carnegie Report and Best 
Practices, both of which are highly critical of existent law school pedagogy. 
        One is almost tempted to argue that the proponents of more practical skills‘ claims that 
they will improve law school education have it exactly backwards.  After all, there has been 
a substantial increase in provision of practical skills in law schools and yet law school 
pedagogy has gotten worse, if the amount of criticism is any measure.  What is the cure?  
More of what has not, to this point, solved the problem—emphasis on practical skills 
because what has not worked so far will surely work better if only it is applied in greater 
doses. 
        Of course, this argument is not really fair.  In the last twenty years, there have been 
substantial changes in the legal profession that have reduced mentoring and required greater 
emphasis on law students‘ graduating with a greater ability to hit the ground running with 
respect to practice skills.  In addition, students have changed.  Substantial numbers of them 
come in seriously lacking skills in critical thinking, as well as the ability to read and write 
effectively.  See supra text accompanying note 45.  Given these changes in the environment, 
it is inappropriate to blame the increase on emphasis for practical skills for the continued 
dissatisfaction with legal education.  In fact, I believe that the increase in emphasis has been 
productive.  Nonetheless, I believe that it needs to take place after other foundational skills 
have been mastered. 
144 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 89-90.  There is likely one further impediment to law 
schools quickly changing.  Faculty are notorious for believing they are above average.  Try 
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Finally, it must be remembered that law schools are more than 
simply vocational schools.  They play a part in helping to shape the 
contours of law and society.  Given that situation, it is appropriate for 
law schools to hire faculty who are eminently qualified to fill that 
role.  There is no reason to think that faculty with those interests will 
be capable of carrying out the suggested mandates of the Carnegie 
Report and Best Practices.  In fact, given the current problems alle-
gedly created by undue emphasis on scholarship, it is likely that they 
will not.  Thus, the legitimate values of the law school also act to 
make it more difficult to enact the changes called for by the Carnegie 
Report and Best Practices. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Law schools should not stand still with respect to improving 
the quality of their teaching.  Even without the external impetus of 
such stimuli as the Carnegie Report and Best Practices, they should 
strive to improve the quality of instruction for their students.  The 
Carnegie Report and Best Practices are thoughtful analyses and well 
worth reading, but they should not be taken as gospel.  They should 
be explored, not venerated.  These two works are substantially flawed 
with respect to their suggestion that the first year curriculum should 
substantially deemphasize the use of Socratic dialogue.  This sugges-
tion is based on a misguided criticism of Socratic dialogue as well as 
an inaccurate assumption about the efficacy of experiential learning 
vis-à-vis Socratic dialogue for first year students. 
This is not to say that every teacher in the first year curricu-
lum should be forced to use Socratic dialogue.  Although I have spent 
a substantial amount of time on this paper defending the Socratic di-
alogue and the need to focus on analysis and synthesis skills, I recog-
nize that not everybody teaches the same way.  If faculty believe they 
are more effective teaching using a different style, there is no reason 
they should not use that different style.  If the Carnegie Report and 
 
this experiment.  Gather all your faculty in one room.  Then ask them to rank themselves as 
either being above average or below average as a classroom teacher.  The odds are good that 
at least 90% of them will state that they are above average in the classroom.  That means at 
least 40% of them are wrong.  How likely is it that a faculty member who believes he or she 
is above average will be ready to engage in radical change that requires extensive labor at the 
expense of scholarship? 
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Best Practices cause a professor to think about what style is best 
suited to him or her, then they will have performed a very valuable 
function. 
However, to the extent that they are read as suggesting that 
Socratic dialogue is somehow an inappropriate or inadequate teach-
ing technique or that a curriculum that focuses on analysis and syn-
thesis in the first year is somehow deficient and that both the tech-
nique and curriculum must be changed, they are misguided at best 
and likely to be counterproductive at worst.  They set up strawmen of 
bad teaching and then talk about the need for new teaching styles. 
I hope I have made two points clear: 1) Socratic dialogue is an 
effective means of teaching the skills that first year students need to 
learn; and 2) it is likely to be more effective in teaching first year stu-
dents those skills than experiential learning.  It must also be noted 
that students have changed over the years, and Socratic dialogue has 
been effective throughout all these changes.  There is no reason to 
think this generation is so different that teaching must change to be 
effective.  In fact, given the problems these students have, teaching 
by Socratic dialogue may be absolutely necessary. 
As Lynne Truss puts it so succinctly in Eats, Shoots and 
Leaves, 
The printed word is presented to us in a linear way, 
with syntax supreme in conveying the sense of the 
words in their order. . . . All those conditions for read-
ing are overturned by the new technologies.  Informa-
tion is presented to us in a non-linear way, through an 
exponential series of lateral associations.145 
Given that this is how our students are now experiencing 
reading and writing and the importance of the written word to law-
yers, we will need to redouble our efforts.  The emphasis on reading 
is well-suited to Socratic dialogue. 
Maybe Best Practices is right; maybe there are a large number 
of poor teachers who misuse Socratic dialogue.  In that case, there is 
no reason to believe that such teachers will become any more effec-
tive using experiential learning techniques than Socratic dialogue.  
Transforming them into better teachers by changing the curriculum is 
 
145 LYNNE TRUSS, EATS, SHOOTS AND LEAVES 180-81 (2004). 
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a pipe dream.  It is a systemic response to problems caused not by a 
flawed system but by individuals.  Now, a systemic response that 
takes into account individual foibles can work.  In fact, good systems 
must take into account individual foibles.  There is no evidence that 
the new system will be better adapted to faculty members‘ foibles 
than the existent one.146 
In 2007, the New York Times printed an article about curricu-
lar change at a number of law schools.147  In his blog, Professor Brian 
Leiter posted a response to that article by Professor Pierce that was 
scathing in its criticism of the curricular reform described in the ar-
ticle.148  It in essence stated there was nothing new under the sun; that 
the reforms were nothing new—they had been tried before and found 
wanting.149  Professor Leiter then followed the statement with his 
own commentary.  While I think that further experimentation with 
the curriculum to improve the law school educational experience is 
warranted, Professor Leiter‘s comments seem entirely appropriate to 
the first year curriculum.  He states: 
The fact is that (1) being ―trained to think like a law-
yer‖—which really means (a) honing analytical and 
argumentative skills of general applicability (legal rea-
soning is distinguished only by the fact that arguments 
from authority are not fallacious) in the context of (b) 
law-specific institutions, rhetoric, and categories—and 
(2) learning substantive rules and principles in differ-
ent areas of the law, are tasks that law schools can ac-
tually discharge, and that good law schools do dis-
charge.  Certainly there should be substantial clinical 
opportunities (and a variety of them) and the like, but 
the perennial idea that law schools need curricular 
 
146 The solution to that problem is to either improve their teaching or get rid of them.  As a 
practical matter, that is not likely to happen.  A solution to that problem will likely need to 
be long-term.  Law schools must put greater emphasis on teaching and selecting for good 
teachers rather than merely looking at credentials that provide no guarantee that an applicant 
will be a good teacher. 
147 Jonathan D. Glater, Training Law Students for Real-Life Careers, NY TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/education/31lawschool.html?_r=1. 
148 Brian Leiter, Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports, LEITERLAWSCHOOL, 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/ (last visited July 25, 2011). 
149 Id. 
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reform strikes me as being ill-motivated by any actual 
evidence.150 
This strikes me as an accurate observation.  The reason it is 
accurate can be found in, of all places, Best Practices, which states: 
A well-rounded legal education requires exploration of 
all of these domains, for textual exegesis, rule choice, 
fact development, contextual analysis, narrative de-
velopment and policy analysis are all integral to so-
phisticated lawyering.  Any of these domains can be 
explored in the format that is described by the term 
Socratic teaching, as that term is used in law 
schools.151 




151 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 215. 
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